The Decision to File Federal Criminal
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Prosecutorial Discretion
Richard S. Fraset
A recurring problem in criminal justice administration is the
exercise of discretion-in particular, the decision whether or not to
invoke formal penalties or procedures. All discretion is subject to
abuse, but the "discretion to be lenient" poses especially difficult
problems because it tends to be less visible, and because its "victims"--complaining parties, the public at large, and other defendants who did not receive leniency-have traditionally had few if
any means to contest these decisions.1 The most visible forms of
leniency in the later stages of the criminal. justice process have recently come under severe attack. Thus, one of the major objections
to traditional plea bargaining practices has been that they seem to
result in a general (but inconsistent) "watering down" of charges.2
Similarly, recent proposals for mandatory sentencing reflect, in
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GOALS, COURTS Standard 3.1, at 46 (1973) (proposal to abolish all plea negotiation by 1978).

19801

Federal ProsecutorialDiscretion

part, a concern that the criminal justice system is treating some
offenders too leniently.3
It has long been recognized, however, that police and prosecutors exercise even broader discretion in the arrest and screening
stages that precede the filing of formal charges.4 These decisions
are made at perhaps the least visible stages of the criminal justice
process, and they are subject to few legal controls. 5 Yet if these
decisions are completely unregulated, the value of closely controlling the later, more visible stages of procedure is slight. Police and
prosecutors can evade even the strictest plea bargaining and sentencing controls by simply not arresting or charging certain offenders, or not charging certain offenses. e Thus, the existing, broad discretion of police and prosecutors raises important policy issues:
Who should be arrested or prosecuted, and on what charges?
When is it appropriate to treat "similar" offenders differently? Are
improper motives playing any part in the selection process? What
kinds of procedures can be devised to regulate or limit these deci7
sions, so that desirable substantive policy can be enforced?
I See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2) (Supp. 1979) (requiring the sentencing judge to impose a prison term, rather than probation, upon conviction of certain
offenses).
4

See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE

CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 10-11,

133 (1967).

See text and notes at notes 145-154 infra.
6 For a discussion of the effect of mandatory minimum sentences on prosecutorial
charging decisions, see Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, Punishing Homicide in Philadelphia:
Perspectives on the Death Penalty, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1976).
7 The simplest answer to these problems would be to abolish all discretion and institute
a requirement of full enforcement. But the necessity and legitimacy of selective arrest and
prosecution can be defended on a number of grounds. First, some of the offenders accused
by victims or the police are innocent; they should be screened out of the system as soon as
possible, to minimize the hardships of false accusation. Other offenders, although probably
guilty, are unconvictable due to problems of proof, illegal searches, and the like. Since litigation is expensive, it makes sense to screen out these weak cases as soon as it becomes apparent that further investigation will not yield sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. Second, even if defendants are convictable, they may not be persons whom the legislature
intended to punish. Some laws (for example, gambling) are intentionally overbroad, so as to
confront the professional criminal with "a statutory facade that is wholly devoid of loopholes." LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532,
533 (1970) (quoting 2 A.B.A. COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 75 (1952)). Other examples of legislative "overcriminalization" involve legislative
attempts to uphold "morals," with no expectation (in modern times, at least) that the laws
will be enforced-for example, laws againt fornication and adultery. Id. Even laws that are
meant to be generally enforced may properly not be invoked on occasion. Since the legislature cannot foresee all factual situations and mitigating circumstances that may arise, selective enforcement is necessary in order to individualize justice. Id. at 534. Indeed, there may
be cases in which nonprosecution, or some alternative to prosecution such as restitution,
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The purpose of the present study is to contribute to a better
understanding of the nature of these invisible discretionary decisions and of the need for and feasibility of various internal and
external controls such as administrative rulemaking and judicial
review. It focuses on prosecutorial rather than police discretion,
largely because prosecutors keep more complete records. The inquiry is further narrowed to the decision whether or not to prosecute; the more complex (and usually undocumented) decision concerning which charges to file remains an important area for further
research.
There have been a number of recent studies of the reasons for
nonprosecution in federal and state courts," but most have not
gone beyond an impressionistic presentation of the different rationales and concepts. For example, although we know that all prosecutors eliminate cases for insufficient evidence, 9 we have no quantitative measure of the relative importance of this factor in relation
to (or in combination with) other factors weighing for or against
prosecution. Indeed, we have very little data on the rates, let alone
the reasons, for nonprosecution. 1°
The present study examines the exercise of discretion by federal prosecutors. These decisions generally occur prior to the point
at which an arrest is made,1 and are fully documented by the asmay be preferable to formal prosecution. Finally, selective enforcement may simply be an
economic necessity. Given insufficient resources to arrest and prosecute all offenders who
"ought" to be prosecuted, it makes sense to focus on the more serious cases.
8 E.g., F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME
(1969); Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1044-72 (1972). See generally W. TESLIK,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE (1975).
9 F. MILLER, supra note 8, at 9-149.
10 Perhaps the best quantitative study of such reasons was an analysis of the disposi-

tion of felony arrests in Los Angeles County, showing not only the rates of prosecution, by
offense, but also the reasons cited for nonprosecution of two offenses: burglary and possession of dangerous drugs. P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGGIO, M. STRUMWASSER & P. DE
LEON, PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECnVE (1973). Reasons for nonprosecution of other offenses were not reported, however,
and a further limitation of the study is that it fails to address the arrest decision itself.
Other recent studies of the disposition of arrested defendants include J. EISENSTEIN &
H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977) (cover-

ing Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERIM FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
(1977) (Washington, D.C. Superior Court); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS:
THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS (1977). See also McIntyre
& Lippmann, Prosecutorsand Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 A.B.A. J. 1154 (1970)
(showing estimated screening rates by police, prosecutors, and courts in six cities).
11 See text at note 24 infra. Some federal law enforcement agencies engage in consider-

1980]

Federal ProsecutorialDiscretion

sistant prosecutors involved. Although the nature of federal crime
is quite different from the typical state or local offense, 1 2 previous
studies of federal prosecutors1 3 suggest that many of the basic reasons for prosecution and nonprosecution in federal and state cases
are similar.

By examining both the characteristics of cases prosecuted and
declined, and the reasons asserted for nonprosecution, this study

will identify and measure the factors that govern prosecution decisions, and will assess the extent to which these operating principles
are consistently and efficiently applied. The policy implications of

these findings will then be considered. Finally, a series of appendices will set forth in more detail the methodology of the study, and
refine the basic empirical data presented in the text.
I.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM

Prosecution of federal criminal cases in each of the ninety-four
judicial districts is the responsibility of the United States Attorney, who is appointed by the President for a four-year term."'
Thus, unlike most of his state and local counterparts, the federal
prosecutor is not an elected official, and is not subject to popular
political pressures, although he may be removed by the President.' 5 U.S. Attorneys are also subject to overall supervision by the
able screening of criminal matters prior to referral to U.S. Attorneys, see Rabin, supra note
8, at 1039-40, 1052-53; see also note 17 infra, not referring matters that they know will be
subsequently declined, Rabin, supra note 8, at 1053. This study did not examine the exercise of such pre-referral discretion, but still probably sheds some light on the nature and
extent of pre-referral screening. See text and notes at notes 43, 45 infra; note 38 infra.
2 There is, however, a large degree of overlap between state and federal criminal jurisdiction. See text at note 18 infra.
2s E.g., J. EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES (1978); Baker, To Indict or Not
to Indict: ProsecutorialDiscretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405
(1978); Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development of
ProsecutorialPolicy, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 310 (1978); Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174 (1965); Rabin, supra note 8; Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption:A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65
GEo. L.J. 1171 (1977); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948); Note, The Petite Policy:An Example of Enlightened ProsecutorialDiscretion,66 GEo. L.J. 1137 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Petite Policy]; Note, Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act and the Expansion of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction,66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306 (1975).
14 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1976).
15 Id. § 541(c). This power is rarely used except when a new President chooses to replace all U.S. Attorneys. See J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 97-98, 111.
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Department of Justice in Washington,"6 and certain kinds of cases
are screened by Department of Justice attorneys. 17 In most cases,
however, the U.S. Attorney has complete control over which
charges, if any, will be filed in his district.
Federal criminal laws frequently overlap with state statutes,
permitting the federal prosecutor additional flexibility in the selection of cases. For example, most federal theft, fraud, and narcotics
violations are also violations of state law. Since the police power is
a state function,18 the federal prosecutor may believe that primary
responsibility for the prosecution of such offenses lies with state
authorities. Thus, U.S. Attorneys often decline low-priority cases
in favor of state prosecution, whereas state deferral of such cases
to federal prosecution is generally deemed less appropriate." Another large category of federal crimes involves violations of administrative or regulatory schemes, for which a wide variety of civil or
administrative remedies is available as alternatives to prosecu18 The Attorney General "shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States Attorneys. . . in the
discharge of their respective duties." 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1976). Section 542 of Title 28 gives
the Attorney General power to appoint and remove all Assistant United States Attorneys,
and section 547(5) requires each United States Attorney to "make such reports as the Attorney General may direct." Pursuant to this authority, the Department requires all U.S. At-

torneys to submit statistics on the filing and disposition of all civil and criminal cases, as
well as the nature and disposition of all civil and criminal investigations in which any attorney spends at least one hour of time. EXEcuTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OP
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S DOCKET AND REPORTING SYsTEM (1973) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. ATTORNEY'S DOCKET AND REPORTING SYsTEM]. The Department has also issued
a U.S. Attorney's Manual and periodic directives and guidelines for the handling of particular kinds of cases, but many U.S. Attorneys ignore these instructions. See J. EISENSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 66-67; Note, The PetitePolicy, supra note 13, at 1143-44. See also Materials Relating to ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (Nov. 22, 1978)
(reprint of two Department of Justice memoranda containing general guidelines for prosecution and charging decisions, plea bargaining, and handling of defendants who "cooperate";
these policy statements are expressly nonbinding on any federal prosecutor).
17 For example, all income tax prosecutions require Department of Justice approval,
and the IRS refers its cases directly to the Department rather than to local U.S. Attorneys.
See Rabin, supra note 8, at 1039-40. During the period covered by our study, the Department did not approve about 10% of the referrals received from the IRS. See [1974] U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 146.
18 For a discussion of the historical development of federal criminal jurisdiction, see
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 64-66.
19 State prosecutors may be able to transfer responsibility for some cases to other state
prosecutors. For example, attorneys general in most states enjoy statutory or common-law
authority to prosecute some or all criminal offenses, even though local prosecutors also have
jurisdiction. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS
OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 104-07 (1977).
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tion.2 0 Finally, since much federal crime involves interstate movement21 and prosecution is normally appropriate in any district affected, a number of federal offenses are reported to more than
one U.S. Attorney, even though ultimately only one office will prosecute the case.
The extent to which the U.S. Attorneys take advantage of this
relative freedom to decline prosecution is indicated in Table 1: less
than one-fourth of the complaints received by the ninety-four U.S.
Attorneys appear to result in the filing of formal charges. As shown
in Table 2, this estimated rate of prosecution varies considerably
by offense. These figures must be viewed as rough estimates, since
the cases filed in a given year are not necessarily the same complaints received that year, and, as indicated in the notes to Table
1, the published figures on complaints and cases filed tend to overstate the number of "new" charges. Nevertheless, it seems likely
that the overall federal prosecution rate for the nation as a whole
is no more than 25%, and probably no less than 20%. These
figures are considerably lower than the prosecution rates in state
systems for which published data are available.2"
It should also be noted that of the 120,000 matters that go
unprosecuted each year, the vast majority do not involve any arrest
or other formal apprehension of the suspect. Published court statistics suggest that only about 23,000 suspects are arrested but not
prosecuted each year; this total probably represents about 17,000
matters.2 4 Thus, the prosecutorial discretion of the U.S. Attorney
operates at a stage of procedure that, in state criminal justice systems, is much more likely to be controlled by the police. Analysis
of these prearrest complaints and the reasons given for not filing
formal charges therefore provides a unique opportunity to examine
20 See Rabin, supra note 8, at 1058-61.

11 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976) (interstate transport of stolen motor vehicle or aircraft).
22 See id. § 3237.
' See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGGIO, M. STRUMWASSER & P. DE LEON,
supra note 10 (overall felony prosecution rate varying from 46% to 55%).
24 United States magistrates processed about 37,000 initial appearances of unindicted
defendants per year, in 1976 through 1978. See [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
ANN. REP. Table M-3, at 423; [1977] id. at 492; [1978] id. at 514. About 14,000 of these
defendants were subsequently prosecuted. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FOURTH
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

1974, at A-2 (1979)

(total pre-indictment arrests in the two-and-one-half-year period ending December 31, 1978,
divided by two and one-half). The difference, 23,000 defendants, includes many multi-defendant cases; based on the ratio of 1.4 defendants per case, reflected in published figures
for prosecuted defendants, see [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. Table
M-3, at 423; [1977] id. at 492; [1978] id. at 514, 23,000 defendants would represent about
17,000 matters.
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TABLE 1
PROSECUTION RATES FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS

Fiscal Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
5-year
average

New Criminal
Matters Received a

New Criminal Estimated Percentage
Cases Filed b of Cases Prosecuted c

160,670
163,301
161,968
148,731
144,074

35,440
38,227
36,349
30,565
28,745

22.1
23.4
22.4
20.6
20.0

155,749

33,865

21.7

SOURCE: U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICE STATISTICAL

REPORT Table 7 (1974) ; id. (1975) ; id. (1976) ; id. (1977); id. (1978).
a The published figures for "matters received" include some double counting:
appeals and superseding indictments are counted as additional "matters," and
transfers under Rules 20 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
counted as one "matter" in both districts affected. To arrive at estimates of
"new matters" received in each year, these cases have been subtracted, using
figures obtained from the above source and from [1974] ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S.
COURTS ANN. REP. Table M-3, at 548; [1975] id. at 499; [1976] id. at 423;
[1977] id. at 492; [1978] id. at 514.
b The published figures for "cases filed" include all of the above forms of double
counting except Rule 40 transfers. Again, these cases have been subtracted to
arrive at estimates of "new cases" filed for each year.
c The percentage is the ratio of cases filed to matters received. Because the cases
filed in any given year are not always received as matters in that year, the figures
for individual years are less reliable than the five-year average. If the various
forms of double counting referred to above were not subtracted, the prosecution
rates would appear somewhat higher-for example, 25.1% for the five-year
average.

the exercise of discretion at the earliest stages of the criminal justice process.
The present study was conducted in the Northern Distict of
Illinois, which includes metropolitan Chicago and most of the
northern section of the state.25 Several factors make this district
particularly suitable for such a study. First, the district contains a
25 For the specific counties included in the district, see 28 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1976). During

the period covered by our study, the district had thirteen federal judges, three full-time
magistrates, and one part-time magistrate. There were approximately 70 lawyers in the U.S.
Attorney's office, but only 10 to 15 were actively involved in screening decisions.
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TABLE 2
PROSECUTION RATES FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS BY OFFENSE

1974-1978

CD

U

10
;4

CS

4

Cd

Offense

Controlled substances
Counterfeiting and forgery
Embezzlement
Fraud against government
Escape
Immigration
Motor vehicle theft
Stolen property
Postal
Weapons control
All others
Total

4

,

9,911
11,380
5,829
9,754
5,770
5,477
9,620
8,484
6,506
4,202
88,498

6,619
935
136
2,736
797
1,667
1,351
1,282
3,172
2,926
19,962

66.8
8.2
2.3
28.1
13.8
30.4
14.0
15.1
48.8
69.6
22.6

165,432

41,583

25.1

0

SOURCE: U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICE STATISTICAL
REPORT at 3 & Table 3 (1974) ;id.(1975) ; id.(1976) ; id.(1977) ; id.(1978).
NOTE: The figures for "matters received" include appeals, superseding charges,
and double counting of Rule 20 transfers and Rule 40 removals. See Table 1,note
a. The figures for "cases filed" include appeals, superseding charges, and double
counting of Rule 20 transfers. See Table 1, note b. If it were practicable to exclude these in the analysis by offense, the estimated prosecution rates shown here
would probably be slightly lower. See Table 1, note c.

large and varied caseload,2 6 which makes it possible to study prose-

cution decisions within a fairly narrow time span-so as to minimize the impact of shifting crime rates or changes in applicable
law or personnel-and still have ,alarge enough sample to permit
26 In fiscal year 1974, there were 796 original criminal proceedings filed in the Northern
District, and 53 other cases were received by transfer from other districts. [1974] ADMIN.

ANN.REP. Table D-1, at 459. Nine of the other 93 federal judicial districts had a higher total number of criminal cases filed in that year. Id.

OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,

254
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statistical analysis. The Northern District also appears to have a
27
prosecution rate that is even lower than the national average.
Such selectivity calls for closer examination, and it also seems
likely to provide a rich source of insights into the exercise of
discretion.
Perhaps the most important reason for studying prosecution
decisions in the Northern District, however, relates to the nature
of the pretrial screening procedures used there. When a criminal
matter is referred to the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District,
an entry is made in a daily log book and an initial screening decision is made by the Chief of the Criminal Division. About 50% of
all matters are identified as "immediate declinations" 28 at this
stage, but regardless of the preliminary screening decision, each
matter is assigned to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, who examines the
offense in more detail and recommends prosecution or declination.29 For all recommended declinations, the reasons justifying
nonprosecution are written up by the Assistant in the form of a file
memorandum. The memorandum is then attached to the case file
and circulated for review by the Chief of the Criminal Division and
the First Assistant U.S. Attorney. The research value of this system is twofold: it permits quantitative analysis of the reasons for
nonprosecution, and it provides a case study of an administrative
procedure designed to maintain consistent enforcement of office
prosecution policies.
27

In fiscal years 1971 through 1975, the Northern District received an average of 5,420

criminal matters per year. An average of 1,012 criminal cases were filed each year during
this period, which yields an estimated gross prosecution rate of 19%; for all 94 districts, the
rate was 27%. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICE STATISTICAL REPORT,'Table 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ATTORNEYS' OFFICE STATISTICAL REPORT]; id.
(1972); id. (1973); id. (1974); id. (1975). As indicated in the notes to Table 1, these figures
include appeals, superseding charges, and other forms of double counting. If all instances of
double counting could be removed, as was done in Table 1, the estimated prosecution rate
for the Northern District would probably be around 16%; for all 94 districts it was 24%.
28 These unprosecuted cases are referred to as "miscellaneous" matters by Northern
District staff, but I will use the term "immediate declinations" throughout this article, so as
to coitrast these matters with declinations entered at later stages of office screening. See
Appendix C infra.
It is unknown whether or not this preliminary-screening procedure is employed in most
federal districts. The U.S. ATTORNEY'S DoCKET AND REPORTING SYSTEM, supra note 16, permits U.S. Attorneys to submit only a monthly summary of those declinations in which prosecution is immediately declined, but this statistical directive does not require U.S. Attorneys to adopt any particular screening procedure.
29 Several "immediate declinations" in our study were subsequently reconsidered, and
three were actually prosecuted, which indicates that the preliminary screening decision is
not final.
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II.

THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The basic research methodology employed in this study involved use of a random sample of 800 "matters" received by the
U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois from October 1,
1973, through March 31, 1974. A "matter" was defined as any complaint logged in by the Criminal Division during this period that
had not previously been received by the office in any form.3 0 This
cohort of new matters was then followed to disposition, and all
available information on all suspects in each matter was coded
from files in the U.S. Attorney's office, court records, and U.S.
Marshal's office records.3 " This longitudinal approach permits the
comparison of characteristics of defendants whose prosecutions
30 We sampled 300 (28%) of the 1,086 matters that were declined immediately during
the six-month study period, and 500 (46%) of the 1,087 other matters received. After elimination of matters that had previously been received, our total sample consisted of 758 matters, containing 1,071 suspects. We sampled a higher proportion of matters not declined
immediately, in order to obtain enough prosecuted cases to permit detailed analysis. The
figures on total matters and declinations reported irrthis article have been adjusted to compensate for the different sampling fractions used.
3' We were given free access to the U.S. Attorney's files of all declined cases in our
sample, and these files proved a rich source of data. In addition to the declination memoranda described in the text, the files revealed many details of the offense: use of force, nature of the victim, dollar amount of loss, nature and amount of drugs, number of guns, and
the like. They sometimes contained information on the age and prior record of defendants,
although the large proportion of missing data prevents any thorough analysis of these
variables.
We did not have access, however, to the U.S. Attorney's files on the prosecuted cases in
our sample, so it was necessary to obtain the details of offenses and offenders from U.S.
magistrate and district court files-for example, statements of prior record made at bail
hearings and offense details stated in complaints and indictments. We also had access to the
records of the U.S. Marshal for the Northern District, which contained specific information
such as age, arrest date, and periods of pretrial detention. With the exception of prior record, we were able to obtain sufficient information from such other sources to permit comparisons of matters prosecuted and declined.
Given the different data sources used, it might be suggested that declined and prosecuted matters are not really comparable, since data on the latter may reflect investigations
completed after the decision to prosecute was made. To some extent, of course, this problem
would arise even if we had complete access to the prosecutor's files. In any case, there are
several reasons to believe that most charges are known at the time of initial referral, and
that, at least for cases not declined immediately, the extent of investigation is comparable to
that accorded prosecuted cases. A comparison of indictment charges with those shown in
earlier logbook and magistrate records reveals that relatively few charges are added, and
those that are usually reflect different legal theories, such as conspiracy, rather than discovery of new crimes. Our study also revealed that cases that are declined, but not immediately,
actually remain open in the office much longer than prosecuted ones; this finding suggests
that the former do not necessarily involve premature termination of investigation.
The study thus proceeds on the assumption that the data on declined and prosecuted
offenses are "comparable." In light of the added offenses mentioned above, however, any
comparisons of offenses are based on logbook charges only.
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were declined or effected contemporaneously, and who were thus
presumably subject to equivalent screening standards. The collection of offense and offender characteristics for matters declined
and prosecuted also permits inferences to be made as to additional
factors, not reflected in the reasons given for declination, that
weigh in favor of prosecution or declination.
Declination memoranda prepared by Assistant U.S. Attorneys
all followed the same format, but the exact phrasing of the reasons
for declination showed considerable variation. In order to permit
computer tabulation of these reasons for the over 500 defendants
in our sample whose prosecutions were declined, it was necessary
to establish specific categories of reasons. Three major reasons-hereafter referred to as "categories"-for declination were
recognized in this study. First were problems of "convictability"-cases with an insufficient legal or factual basis. Second was the availability of criminal or civil alternatives to prosecution, such as parole revocation. And third were "policy" reasons
weighing against prosecution-for example, the value of the defendant's services as an informer or prosecution witness. The specific
reason groups, within each of these major categories, are illustrated
in Table 6. Additional theoretical and methodological aspects of
this analytical framework are discussed in Appendix A.
III.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MATTERS DECLINED AND PROSECUTED

The overall results of the sample confirm the earlier estimates
of prosecution rates in the Northern District, based on published
statistics.32 Sixteen percent of the matters in our sample, or 20%
of defendants, had been prosecuted as of February 1976, which was
almost two years after the most recent matter was received by the
Criminal Division. Four percent of the matters were still pending,
and if all of these are eventually prosecuted, the sample prosecution rate will rise to 20% (23% of defendants). It seems highly
unlikely, however, that very many matters that have remained
open more than two years would be prosecuted. 3 If one excludes
pending matters and certain other cases not subject to
prosecutorial discretion in the Northern District, 34 the overall
31

See note 27 supra.

31 Most of the prosecuted defendants in our sample were indicted within a few months
of the date of referral to the U.S. Attorney, and less than 5% were indicted more than one
year after the date of referral.
" Sixty sample suspects (in 59 cases), charged with unlawful flight to avoid state prosecution ("UFAP"), see 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976), were excluded from the analysis. The pur-
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prosecution rates are: 17 % of matters, and 21 % of defendants.
A.

Offenses Most Frequently Declined and Offenses Most
Frequently Prosecuted

As shown in Table 3, the decision to prosecute appears to be
closely related to the offense involved.3 5 For example, cases involving importation of marijuana or other drugs were rarely prosecuted, whereas cases involving sale or distribution of drugs were
prosecuted more frequently than the average. This distinction is
not as incongruous as it seems; "importing" cases typically involved attempts to mail small amounts of the drug into the country, whereas the "sale" cases involved much larger amounts, with
commercial or conspiracy aspects. A similar distinction exists between interstate-transport-of-stolen-motor-vehicle ("Dyer Act") 6
cases, with and without a conspiracy charge. The latter typically
involve youthful offenders caught "joyriding," whereas the conspiracy charges involved organized rings of professional car thieves.
Other cases that were almost never prosecuted include theft of
government property, theft from interstate shipment, miscellaneous frauds, civil rights cases, 7 and simple assaults. Offenses with
pose of this statute is to give the FBI jurisdiction to assist state authorities in rounding up
fugitives who cross state lines. No UFAP prosecutions have been brought in the Northern
District for many years. Moreover, since UFAP prosecution must be brought in the district
where the state offense occurred, most of the UFAPs in our sample could not have been
prosecuted in the Northern District.
Another 26 suspects (23 matters) who had already been charged by the U.S. Attorney in
another federal district were excluded from the analysis. Upon arrest within the Northern
District, these suspects were promptly "removed" to the charging district under rule 40 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and it does not appear from the files we examined
that there was ever any basis for prosecution in the Northern District.
The number of "prosecuted" cases in our sample also required some adjustment. Four.
teen suspects, in 12 cases, were initially charged in another district, but elected to have their
cases transferred to the Northern District pursuant to rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rather than face "removal" under rule 40. Such cases did not represent "local" matters. Although the transfer requires the consent of the U.S. Attorneys in both districts, it is rare that the receiving district objects, since defendants must agree to plead
guilty in order to be transferred under rule 20. These cases are thus not comparable to local
cases selected for prosecution, and they were excluded. We also excluded one "prosecuted"
case involving two defendants who consented to trial before the U.S. magistrate, because it
was unclear whether these defendants would have been prosecuted in the absence of such
consent.
3' The offense categories established for the purposes of this project are generally comparable to the categories used in published court statistics. See, e.g., [1975] ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. Table D-5, at 423.
36 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
37 The low prosecution rate for civil rights cases may reflect a policy of the Department
of Justice that state authorities be encouraged to prosecute such offenses.
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TABLE 3
PROSECUTION RATES BY OFFENSE FOR LOCAL MATTERS RECEIVED

Percentage
Prosecuted

Offense Category a
Violent offenses b ............................................

50

Mail theft, embezzlement

51

C

....................................

Theft of U.S. property .......................................
Theft from interstate shipment ................................
Stolen autos (conspiracy) .....................................
Stolen autos (no conspiracy) ..................................

4
8
100*
5

Sale, distribution of marijuana ................................
Importing marijuana .........................................
Sale, distribution of other drugs ...............................
Importing other drugs ........................................

40*
2
53
10*

M ail fraud ...................................................
Tax fraud ............
.....................................
False statem ents .............................................
Other fraud .................................................
Em bezzlem ent ...............................................

21
59
21
7
11

Interstate forgery d ..........................................
Other forgery ................................................
Counterfeiting ...............................................

12
16
13

W eapons and explosives .......................................
Extortion, racketeering, and threats ...........................
Civil rights ........
1.........................................
Simple assault ...............................................

24
10
0
0

All other offenses e ...........................................
A ll offenses ..............................................

12
17

* Percentage based on fewer than 10 cases

NOTE: Percentages are based on number of matters received in each offense
category. Matters neither declined nor prosecuted are excluded.
a Indicates the most serious substantive offense charged, based on maximum
authorized sentence.
b Includes rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

c Includes theft and embezzlement by postal employees.
d Interstate transportation of forged securities, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
e None of these offenses represents more than 1% of total matters or defendants
received.
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relatively high prosecution rates included violent offenses, mail
theft, and income tax fraud- 8
Of course, one cannot assume that these different offenses all
presented an equal proportion of prosecutable cases; perhaps the
offenses that show the lowest prosecution rates tend to involve the
greatest problems of proof, illegal police procedures, or other defects. Alternatively, it may be that cases involving these offenses
typically present attractive alternatives to prosecution that are not
available in the case of offenses showing higher prosecution rates.
Both of these hypotheses will be examined through analysis of the
reasons for declination. 9
B.

Differences in "Magnitude" of the Offense Between
Prosecuted and Declined Matters

As suggested above, the decision to prosecute drug offenses
was closely related to both the type and amount of drug involved.
Table 4 shows the prosecution rate for each of twelve drug typeand-amount combinations, and a clear pattern emerges: offenses
involving heroin were most likely to be prosecuted overall, followed
by offenses involving cocaine and marijuana. Furthermore, a different "cutoff point" seems to exist for each drug; no marijuana cases
involving less than a pound of contraband were prosecuted. Cocaine cases involving one to two ounces appear to be a borderline
category, whereas all cases involving amounts of two ounces or
more were prosecuted. As for heroin, it appears that all amounts
might lead to prosecution, but the probability of prosecution was
directly proportional to the amount involved.
3' Since income tax matters are pre-screened in the Department of Justice, see note 17
supra, the high prosecution rate among matters received in the Northern District is to be
expected.
To a lesser extent, the relative "priority" of the other offenses shown in Table 3 may
also reflect different degrees of pre-referral screening. For example, if postal inspectors only
refer their strongest cases, while the FBI refers all matters that it investigates, then the
differences shown in Table 3 might represent only the efforts of the U.S. Attorney's Office to
compensate for differential pre-referral screening; among "comparable" matters received,
the prosecutor might have no priorities whatsoever. We could not evaluate this possibility
directly, but there is some evidence that Table 3 represents real differences in prosecutor
priorities. As previously noted, the initial screening decision in the Criminal Division eliminates about 50% of all matters received, and it seems likely that this step compensates for
many of the differences in pre-referral screening. Nevertheless, when all "immediate declinations" are excluded from the analysis, the offenses in Table 3 show very similar relative
rates of prosecution.
"9See text at notes 172-175 infra.
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TABLE 4
DRUG CASES PROSECUTED

AMOUNT
OF DRUG
1 ounce
or less

MARIJUANA

COCAINE

HEROIN

Percentage Sample
Prosecuted
Size

Percentage Sample
Prosecuted
Size

Percentage Sample
Prosecuted
Size

0%

18

0%

7

30%

9

0

50%

4

67%

3

0%

6

100%

2

100%

5

30%

7

100%

3

100%

1

0%

5

0

0%

2

5%

36

16

52%

20

1 to 2
ounces
2 ounces
to 1 pound
over 1
pound
unknown
All amounts

-

37%

NOTE: Percentages are based on the number of cases received in each drug-type
and amount category, adjusted for differences in sampling fractions. See text at
note 30 supra. The "sample sizes" shown in the table, however, represent the
actual number of cases, prior to adjustment, and are provided as a gauge of the
relative reliability of the individual percentage figures.

A similar pattern emerges when dollar amount of loss is examined, although the extent of overlap between prosecuted and
declined cases is much greater. The median dollar loss of declined
cases was $325, while the median for prosecuted cases was $1,700;
42% of declined cases involved more than $500 loss, whereas the
comparable figure for prosecuted cases was 77%. As shown in
Table 5, these differences also appear within those offense categories for which there are sufficient numbers of cases with known
dollar amounts to permit comparisons. Some offenses, however, appear to be considered prosecutable at lower dollar amounts than
other offenses. Thus, it appears that the offense category and the
dollar amount are independent factors, each of which helps to determine the prosecution priority of a given case.40
40 A further criterion suggested by the table below is the presence or absence of a conspiracy or other organized criminal effort; overall, 45% of matters involving conspiracy
charges were prosecuted, whereas only 16% of nonconspiracy matters were prosecuted. The
largest cases (three or more defendants) also tend to receive prosecution priority; this is true
even when nonconspiracy cases are considered separately. Apparently two's company,
three's a conspiracy!

Federal Prosecutorial Discretion
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TABLE 5
AMOUNT OF Loss
DECLINED CASES

Median
Amount ($)

OFFENSE

Sample
Size

PROSECUTED CASES

Median
Amount ($)

Mail theft (nonpostal
employee)

$225

$1,050

Interstate forgery

$880

$1,385

Other forgery

$315

$ 550

Counterfeiting

$ 40

$ 640

All offenses

$325

$1,700

IV.

Sample
Size

ANALYSIS OF STATED REASONS FOR DECLINATION

The data presented thus far have implied both positive and
negative criteria for the prosecution of federal charges, but we have
a more direct source of information: the file memoranda written by
the Assistant U.S. Attorneys to justify nonprosecution. Ideally, one
would also want to examine written reasons asserted in favor of
prosecution, but no such data source exists. It is often possible,
however, to infer positive prosecution criteria from the reasons for
declination.
Table 6 summarizes the frequency of specific reasons for declining to prosecute 546 suspects. The percentages shown in the
table total to more than 100%, since many declinations involve
Footnote 40, continued:
PROSECUTION RATES OF MATTERS RECEIVED, BY NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS AND
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF CONSPIRACY CHARGES
NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS
Three or
Two
More

CHARGES a

One

Conspiracy b

29%

20%

70%

45%

No conspiracy

16%

11%

28%

16%

16%

12%

34%

17%

Total

Total

NOTE: Percentages are based on number of cases received in each charge/casesize category.

a Based on initial logbook entries.
b Includes combinations of conspiracy and nonconspiracy charges.
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more than one reason. 41 The actual total, 170%, means that there
was an average of 1.7 reasons per defendant.42 Nevertheless, it is
meaningful to compare the relative frequency with which different
reasons occur. The initial inquiry thus takes the form of the following question: For what proportion of declinations was reason X a
factor?
As seen in Table 6, the most common specific reason for declination was the state-prosecution alternative. In order, the next
most frequently cited reasons were: small amount of loss by the
victims; prior record of the defendant; small amount of contraband, such as drugs or guns; the isolated nature of the defendant's
act; and insufficient evidence of a criminal act. In addition, a variety of other factors occasionally moved the Assistant U.S. Attorney
to decline prosecution; a total of forty-three different reasons were
cited in sample declinations. There were also certain reasons that
were never cited, such as the running of the statute of limitations
or the existence of an illegally obtained confession. Furthermore,
some of the "illegal search" declinations involved searches by state
law enforcement officials; thus, our findings suggest that federal
law enforcement agencies operate in a highly professional manner.
Of course, it is also possible that these agencies simply do not refer
matters involving obvious illegality to the U.S. Attorney. 3
The forty-three specific reasons represented in our sample
were too numerous and diverse to permit detailed statistical analysis and presentation, so they were collapsed into ten groups of reasons, as shown in Table 7. "Convictability" reasons were divided
into the four groups shown in Table 7 and "policy" reasons were
divided into the three listed there. On the basis of the preliminary
results shown in Table 6, "prosecution alternatives" were placed in
three groups: state prosecution, civil/administrative, and other.
In Table 7, frequencies of reasons given for declinations are
listed for the ten groups. 44 Minor offense appears most frequently,
See text at notes 165-66 infra.
"' Forty-four percent of the declinations were based on a single reason listed in Table 6;

41

42% were based on two reasons, and 15% were based on three reasons.
43 See note 11 supra.
" The average number of reasons per suspect shown in Table 7 is 1.6, which is slightly
lower than that shown in Table 6 (1.7). This "loss" of reasons is the result of ignoring multiple reasons within the same group; a single reason falling within one of the 10 groups is
sufficient to bring that group into play. For example, if a prosecution was declined because
of both the suspect's age and his prior record (a frequent combination), the reasons are
tallied as one declination under defendant characteristics.
One other adjustment reflected in Table 7 should be noted. The group of reasons referred to in Table 6 as "offense characteristics" was relabeled "minor offense," since all of
the offense-related reasons discovered in the study concerned the perceived triviality of the
offense.
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TABLE 6
REASONS FOR DECLINATION OF DEFENDANTS

Category

Convictability

Reason

Percentage of
Defendants a

No crime
by anyone
by defendant-intent
by defendant-act

Insufficient evidence
to convict anyone
to convict defendant-intent
to convict defendant-act
Parties unavailable
defendant unknown
defendant unavailable
defendant fugitive
victim unavailable
victim reluctant
victim not credible
witness unavailable
witness reluctant
witness not credible
Legal bar
statute of limitations
immunity
illegal search
illegal arrest
illegal confession
venue improper
speedy-trial violation

5
7
10
8
2
1
1
1
1
*
*
*

0
*

2
0
0
*

1

Prosecution

Alternatives

Policy Reasons

State prosecution
Prosecution in another district b
Other charges, this district
Plea bargain
Parole/probation revocation (federal)
Parole/probation revocation (state)
Civil commitment
Civil/administrative remedies
Pretrial diversion
Restitution
Offense characteristics
small amount of contraband
small amount of loss
isolated act
no interstate impact
statutory overbreadth

26.
3
2
*
*
*

0
8
3
4

13
18
11
*

1
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TABLE 6-Continued

Reason

Category
Policy Reasons
continued

Percentage of
Defendants a

Defendant characteristics
age (young or old)
no prior record
family hardship
other mitigating circumstances
informer

6
16
*

2
2

Other
agent recommendation
other district recommendation
Dep't of Justice recommendation
excessive delay (before arrest)
agency misconduct
Total

1
*
*

1

170

*Less than 0.5% but greater than 0.
Average number of reasons per defendant

1.7

a Based on total of 546 defendants with known reasons for declination.
b Does not include defendants sought only in another federal district. See note 34
supra.

followed by state prosecution, insufficient evidence, and defendant
characteristics. A surprisingly large number of declinations involve
the absence of any crime. This might suggest either that federal
law enforcement agencies are not engaging in significant pre-referral screening of matters, 45 or that these agencies and the U.S. Attorney's office do not always agree on what is "criminal."
The figures shown in Table 7 do not distinguish between reason groups that occur alone and those that are cited with other
groups, and as Table 8 indicates, the ten reason groups are not
equally likely to appear in combination. No crime and state prosecution are cited alone about as often as in combination, and the
other two prosecution-alternative groups (civil/administrative and
" See note 11 supra.
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TABLE 7
REASONS FOR DECLINATION OF DEFENDANTS

Category
Convictability

Reason Group

Percentage of
Defendants a

No crime

12

Insufficient evidence

22

Parties unavailable

13

Legal bar

4

Prosecution
Alternatives

State prosecution
Civil/administrative remedies

Policy Reasons

26
8

Other

11

Minor offense b

44

Defendant characteristics

21

Other

3

Total

164

Average number of reasons per defendant c

1.6

a Based on total of 546 defendants with known reasons for declination.
b This category corresponds to the reasons labeled "offense characteristics" in
Table 6 supra.
c The computed average differs from the computed average in Table 6 (1.7 reasons
per defendant). See note 44 supra.

other) also appear alone with some frequency. On the other hand,
minor offense appears alone only 18% of the time; thus, although
this is the most frequently cited reason type (44%), it is cited
alone in only 8% of all declinations (18% of 44%). The other two
groups of "policy" reasons are even less likely to be considered a
sufficient basis for declination. These findings suggest that policy
reasons may be perceived as "weaker" than reasons related to convictability or prosecution alternatives, whereas the latter two categories of reasons are viewed as self-sufficient bases for nonprosecution. Table 8, however, does not take account of combinations
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TABLE 8
REASONS ALONE AND IN COMBINATION

0

o

W4.

Reason

Category
Convictability

-*O

-

No crime

53

31

16

Insufficient evidence

29

55

16

Parties unavailable

19

67

15

Legal bar

21

68

11

State prosecution

46

37

17

Civil/administrative remedies

44

45

11

Other

38

41

21

Minor offense

18

65

16

Prosecution
Alternatives

Policy Reasons

.

Defendant characteristics

5

67

28

Other

4

70

26

45

45

10

All reasons

each
NOTE: Percentages are based on number of defendant declinations involving
reason. Because of rounding, some rows do not total 100%.

46
within these three major categories of reasons. It is thus necessary to examine the specific combinations that occur before reaching any conclusions about the relative "strength" of the three reason categories.

A.

Reason Combinations

Reason combinations were analyzed at a higher level of abstraction; that is, all combinations of convictability, prosecution al46 For example, a declination based on minor offense plus defendant characteristics
basis for nonprosecution.
would represent one in which policy reasons alone were a sufficient

Federal ProsecutorialDiscretion
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ternative, and policy reasons were studied.47 This approach ignores
multiple reasons within each of these three major categories. Thus,
a declination consisting of two policy reasons and one prosecution
alternative is counted as a combination of prosecution alternative
reason plus policy reason; a declination with three different policy
reasons is counted as a single-reason declination.
TABLE 9
CATEGORIES OF REASONS ALONE AND IN COMBINATION

Percentage of
Defendants a
Convictability Only

20

Prosecution Alternative Only

22

Policy Reason Only

18

Convictability + Prosecution Alternative

4

Convictability + Policy Reason

18

Prosecution Alternative + Policy Reason

15

All Three
Total

3
100

a Based on total of 546 defendants with known reasons for declination.

As shown in Table 9, policy reasons are the least likely to appear alone, and the four combinations of the three categories are
not equally common. Combinations of convictability plus policy
and alternatives plus policy are almost as frequent as the incidence
with which these factors occur alone, but combinations of convictability plus alternatives and of all three factors are very rare.
Thus, it appears that prosecution-alternative reasons are relatively
independent of convictability considerations, whereas policy reasons are equally likely to appear alone or in combination with rea4' The two-way and three-way combinations of the 10 reason groups with each other
were examined, and it was found that almost all possible combinations and permutations
occur, although certain combinations are much more common. Over half of the multiplereason declinations involved combinations of minor offense with either insufficient evidence,
parties unavailable, state prosecution, or defendant characteristics. The diversity of other
combinations, however, was too great to permit detailed analysis of all combinations of the
10 groups of reasons.
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sons from either of the two other categories. In terms of the hierarchy of reasons hypothesized in Appendix A,' 8 this suggests that
convictability and prosecution alternatives are equally strong, selfsufficient, and usually mutually exclusive reasons for declination;
policy reasons are relatively less likely to be considered sufficient
bases for declination. Nevertheless, some declinations are based
solely on policy considerations. An examination of the reasons
cited in those cases shows that the defendant's noncriminal record
is the specific policy reason most often cited,'49 but the perceived
triviality of the offense is the most important policy-reason group:
93% of the "policy only" declinations involved this factor.
The figures in Table 9 can be combined to show the overall
frequency of the three categories: "policy" reasons were a factor in
54% of the declinations while convictability and prosecution-alternative reasons were present in 45% and 44% of the declinations,
respectively. Thus, although they are rarely deemed sufficient, policy reasons emerge as the most frequently cited basis for declination. An equally significant finding is that the prosecutor's most
traditional and least controversial source of discretion-pretrial
screening of weak cases-is a factor in less than half of the declinations in the Northern District.
B.

Analysis of Declinations by Offense

Table 10 shows how the frequency of each of the ten groups of
reasons developed earlier"0 varies by type of offense. The Table
reveals that most of the ten groups of reasons occur within each
offense type, albeit with differing frequency; at least at this level of
abstraction, the reasons are not offense-specific. The frequencies,
however, do vary considerably by offense, and this is true even
within offense groupings, such as theft and drugs.
In order to appreciate both the "forest" and the "trees," it
may be useful to summarize the major patterns shown in Table 10
through specific examples of some fairly "typical" cases in our
sample. The danger here, of course, is that no one case is ever truly
"typical," and the use of such paradigms may oversimplify or distort the rich diversity of these cases. With that caveat, consider the
following varieties of declinations:
Mail theft. This category really includes two quite different
See text at notes 164-167 infra.
Forty-two percent of the "policy only" declinations involved this reason.
'o See text at notes 43-44 supra.
18
49
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TABLE 10
REASONS FOR DECLINATION BY OFFENSE

CONVICTABILITY

PROSECUTION

POLICY

ALTERNATIVES

REASONS

W

C3
4..
00
0

CS

0q r
0

OFFENSE CATEGORY
Violent offenses*

Z

4

CJ

0

.

o

C's

41

D .4

MP4

0

..

1: UO

a

0

25

25

0

13

0

0

25

38

0

11
13
0

14
13
12

18
0
60

2
8
0

38
25
4

6
0
12

11
50
0

53
21
64

16
13
12

2
8
0

8

31

27

4

35

4

6

51

14

2

13

4

0

0

61

4

5

70

25

0

3
0
0

17
15
23

5
0
15

1
0
8

23
17
54

3
0
0

1
0
8

72
80
46

53
65
8

4
0
8

Fraud/Embezzlement
false statements
other fraud a
embezzlement

14
16
15
8

32
21
23
67

19
0
17
38

1
0
0
0

8
0
6
8

26
32
33
8

11
16
8
17

31
47
33
21

14
16
13
21

6
0
8
8

Forgery/Counterfeiting
interstate forgery
other forgery
counterfeiting

9
0
6
34

22
21
18
34

8
6
14 11
6
6
0
0

22
32
18
13

0
0
0
0

26
18
41
7

32
29
29
47

29
14
47
20

6
0
9
13

Weapons and explosives
Extortion, racketeering,
and threats
Simple assault

13

9

13

9

41

0

16

47

13

9

34
15

14
31

28
15

7
0

14
0

7
31

10
0

38
46

7
8

0
0

14

19

13

4

24

9

12

44

22

3

Theft
mail theft
theft of U.S. property
theft from interstate
shipment
stolen autos (no
conspiracy)
Drugs
importing marijuana
sale of other drugs

All offenses
* Fewer than 10 cases

NOTE: All figures are percentages, based on total matters in each offense category, with known reasons for declination.
Does not include mail or tax fraud.
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offenses. Thefts and embezzlements by postal employees 1 typically involve very small amounts-a ten-dollar "test letter" sent
through by postal inspectors, or a single watch or other item from
a package-and such offenders are almost always prosecuted or
placed on pretrial diversion. The prosecution and diversion rates
for this offense are unusually high, given the small amounts involved. Such high prosecution rates reflect the considerable pressure by the referring agency, and the belief that strict enforcement
is necessary to deter other employees, particularly short-term mail
handlers hired during the Christmas season.5 2 In contrast, the typical declination for nonemployee mail theft involves theft of packages or welfare checks from mail boxes, in amounts of several hundred dollars; such a case is more likely to be referred to state
prosecution.
Theft of government property.5 3 Several typewriters were reported stolen from a government office; after several months of investigation, there were still no suspects.
Theft from interstate shipment.54 Defendants were arrested
by Chicago police and charged with thefts of appliances worth
about four hundred dollars from an airport loading dock. The case
was referred to state prosecution.
Auto theft (without conspiracy).5 Two youths, aged nineteen
and twenty, stole a car in Indiana and drove to Chicago, where
they were stopped by police. Because only one car was involved
and there were no aggravating circumstances such as existence of
an organized "ring," the case was referred to state prosecution. In
similar cases, the age and absence of prior record of the youths
51

Charges are usually brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976) ("theft of mail matter by

officer or employee"). Nonemployee mail thefts are charged under id. § 1708 ("theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally").
52 Our six-month sample period included the Christmas season. Although we do not
have data for the other six months of fiscal year 1974, we were able to examine computerized data for all matters (other than immediate declinations, which include few mail-theft
charges) that were received during the two previous fiscal years. These data suggest that
prosecution rates for employee mail theft are much higher during the winter months,
whereas other mail thefts receive high priority throughout the year. For fiscal years 1972
and 1973 combined, the estimated prosecution rate for employee mail theft was only 24%;
for other mail theft, it was 50%. In our sample, the prosecution rates for these two offense
groups were 53% and 49%, respectively.
53 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
54 Id.
§ 659. This statute contains a rare provision barring federal prosecution if the
defendant has already been convicted or acquitted "on the merits" in state court for the
"same act or acts." Id. Most deferrals to state prosecution, however, involve pending or
unfiled state charges. See text at note 67 infra.
'5 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
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would sometimes also be cited in support of declination.

5, A package containing
Importing marijuana.
a half pound of
marijuana, sent to a Chicago address from Canada (no return address) was intercepted by customs officials. In cases such as this,
prosecution is typically declined because of the small amount, absence of prior drug offenses, state prosecution, or the difficulty of
proving that the addressee "knowingly or intentionally import[ed]"
57
the drug.
5 8 A "conPossession of other drugs with intent to distribute.
trolled delivery," using marked, "official advance funds" was used
by a drug agent to purchase one ounce of a mixture containing cocaine. In these cases, the small amount involved is cited as a reason somewhat less often than in the case of marijuana offenses; but
state prosecution is cited much more often, usually as the sole
reason for declination.
False statement to federal agency."9 The recipient of a
$250,000 loan from a federally insured bank made a willful and
materially false statement of his assets and liabilities. The loan was
promptly repaid, however (in part because of the threat of prosecution), and the case was declined due to the absence of any actual
loss and the effectiveness of the "civil" recovery procedure. "Civil/
administrative" remedies are frequently cited in fraud cases.
Embezzlement." A federally insured bank found several thousand dollars missing, but there were no suspects (or insufficient evidence to prosecute the most likely suspects). In another embezzlement involving about five hundred dollars, the defendant, a
twenty-two year old teller with no prior record, was placed on pretrial diversion and directed to provide restitution.
6 1 The defendant carInterstate transportof forged securities.
ried forged securities valued at five hundred to one thousand dollars across state lines; he was referred to state prosecution.
Other forgery.62 A twenty-five year old male forged the signature on several stolen welfare checks and obtained goods and cash

"

21 U.S.C. § 952 (1976).
Id. § 960(a)(1).
Id. § 841(a)(1).

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
Id. § 656.
, Id. § 2314. This section provides that interstate transport of stolen "money or property" must involve at least $5,000 in order to violate federal law, but there is no jurisdictional minimum for transportation of forged securities, tax stamps, traveler's checks, or
tools used for forgery or counterfeiting. Id.
" E.g., id. § 471.
40
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worth about three hundred dollars. Due to his age, absence of a
prior record, and the use of pretrial diversion, prosecution was
declined.
6 3 Defendant passed two counterfeit twentyCounterfeiting.
dollar bills. Since he did not appear to be part of any larger operation and it was not clear whether he knew the bills were counterfeit, the case was declined.
C.

Adjusted Prosecution Rates

The data on reasons can be used to refine our earlier estimates
of prosecution rates by type of offense and other known offense
characteristics. When "weak cases" (those declined for convictability reasons) are excluded, the overall prosecution rate for
matters received rises from 17% to 26%, but the relative priority
of different offenses is not substantially altered. In other words,
coincidental variations in the relative strengths of different types
of cases do not account for the observed differences in "gross"
prosecution rates, as is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.64
V.

ANALYSIS OF REFERRALS TO STATE PROSECUTION

As shown in Table 6, the most frequent specific reason for
declination is the state-prosecution alternative, which was a factor
in about one-fourth of the declinations in our sample. Moreover,
state prosecution is often deemed a sufficient reason for declination, appearing alone 46% of the time.65 Because this is such an
important basis for declination and because little is known about
the eventual disposition of matters so declined, the study examined this reason more closely so as to determine what kinds of
cases are involved, in which state jurisdictions prosecution occurs,
and with what final results.
A.

Declined Offenses

As Table 10 demonstrates, prosecution is more likely to be declined in favor of state prosecution for some cases than for others.
Such declinations are particularly common in interstate-stolen63 Id. § 472. The sample included some declined matters in which the suspect had used
a dollar-bill facsimile in advertising. These matters were so unlike the typical counterfeit
case described in the text that we classified them as "miscellaneous" offenses, rather than
"counterfeiting."

" See text and notes at notes 171-183 infra.
" See Table 8 supra.
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auto cases not involving any conspiracy aspects. Weapons and
drug-sale cases (except those involving marijuana) also show very
high rates of declination in favor of state prosecution. Other offenses, such as fraud, embezzlement, and simple assault, are rarely
declined for this reason. In some cases, this is because there is no
state counterpart of the federal offense. Table 11 lists the variety
of federal offenses that are declined in favor of state prosecution. 6
66

MATTERS DECLINED IN FAVOR OF STATE PROSECUTION
JURISDICTION a

FEDERAL OFFENSE

City of
Chicago
(Percentage)

Other
Cook County b
(Percentage)

Burglary, larceny, stolen
property

Other
Northern
District C
(Percentage)

Out-ofState d
(Percentage)

45

18

26

82

Drugs

9

18

30

0

Fraud, embezzlement

9

18

0

0

Forgery, counterfeiting

9

6

26

9

Weapons and explosives

15

12

4

3

Other

12

29

13

6

99

101

99

100

47

12

17

'24

Total e
State Declinations
per Jurisdiction
(Percentage)

a Where more than one jurisdiction was involved, the principal place of the
most serious offense is shown.
b Includes Berwyn, River Forest, Niles, Calumet City, Cicero, Elmhurst, Forest
Park, Wilmette, Franklin, and Justice, Illinois.
c Includes Rockford, Joliet, Roselle, LaSalle County, Will County, DuPage County, Countryside, Darien, Freeport, and Galena, Illinois.
d Includes Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Florida, Alabama, Texas, California, and the State of Washington.
eBecause of rounding, some totals do not equal 100 S.
The above table summarizes the state jurisdictions in which these cases were to be
brought. Not surprisingly, almost half of these declinations involved the Chicago branches
of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and over three-quarters were from jurisdictions within
the Northern District of Illinois. Out-of-state jurisdictions included a number of Southern
and Western states, as well as two Midwest states bordering on the Northern District (Wisconsin and Indiana). There were, however, no downstate Illinois jurisdictions involved,
which is probably a reflection of the fact that matters logged in by the Criminal Division for
the Northern District of Illinois involve either interstate movement or crimes committed
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TABLE 11
MATTERS DECLINED IN FAVOR OF STATE PROSECUTION
BY OFFENSE

Federal Offense
Violim t offenses ..............................................
M ail theft ...................................................
Theft of U.S. property ........................................
Theft from interstate shipment ................................
Stolen autos (no conspiracy) ..................................
Other interstate stolen property ................................
Other theft offenses ..........................................

Percentage
1
4
1
13
25
2
3

Importing marijuana .........................................
Sale of other drugs ...........................................
Importing other drugs ........................................

6
6
1

M ail fraud .................................................
All other fraud ..............................................
Embezzlement ...............................................

2
2
1

Interstate forgery ...........................................
Other forgery ................................................
Counterfeiting ...............................................

7
4
1

W eapons and explosives ......................................
Extortion, racketeering, and threats ...........................

10
3

All other offenses ............................................
Total a

7
99

NOTE: Based on total of 92 matters in which one or more defendants were declined because of state prosecution.
a Because of rounding, total does not equal 100%.

The state offenses for which these defendants were to be
charged were not always direct counterparts of the federal charges,
although this was the most common pattern (for example, a state
entirely within the Northern District; crimes committed within the Southern and Eastern
Districts of Illinois are referred to the U.S. Attorneys for those districts.
As shown in the table, the federal offenses referred to state prosecution are not equally
distributed among the state jurisdictions involved. Almost half of the Chicago cases were
burglary, larceny, or other theft, offenses, primarily thefts from interstate shipments, and
over 80% of the out-of-state cases were theft offenses (all but one of which involved interstate transport of stolen automobiles). Non-Chicago Cook County cases were more likely to
involve miscellaneous offenses, whereas other Northern District cases involved relatively
high proportions of drug and forgery or counterfeiting offenses.
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charge of auto theft or unauthorized use would be brought in place
of the federal charge of unlawful interstate transport). As shown in
Table 12, some defendants were charged with a different state offense that grew out of the same incident. In other cases, the defendant had been prosecuted or was expected to be charged for a
completely unrelated state offense, usually a more serious one than
the federal charge. These latter cases represent a very different
theory of declination; rather than shifting prosecution of the crime
to state courts, the offense is exempted from federal prosecution
on the theory that unrelated state penalties sufficiently punish,
treat, or incapacitate the offender. Such declinations thus represent a greater element of policymaking discretion, since the
particular criminal episode that was the subject of the federal offense will not be prosecuted at all.
TABLE 12
DEFENDANTS DECLINED IN FAVOR OF STATE PROSECUTION:
COMPARISON OF STATE AND FEDERAL CHARGES

Percentage of
Nature of State Charges
Similar to federal charges and based
on the same criminal episode
Different from federal charges but arising
out of the same criminal episode
Completely unrelated to the federal offense
State charges unknown

Total

Defendants

69
6
17
8

100

Table 13 shows the disposition or status of state prosecution
efforts noted in the U.S. Attorney's file at the time federal charges
were declined. A few defendants had already been convicted in
state court (mostly on unrelated charges), and a larger number
were involved in pending state cases, but about half had not yet
been formally charged. Moreover, many of the defendants "arrested but not charged" were not held in the jurisdiction with the
strongest case.6 7 Thus in many instances, particularly interstate-

67 For example, in an interstate-stolen-car case, the state of arrest may only have jurisdiction to file an "unauthorized use" charge, whereas the home state has a legal basis (and
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stolen-car cases, the reference to "state prosecution" seems to represent a statement of policy rather than of fact; that is, such cases
ought to be'handled by state rather than federal authorities, even
if state authorities do not actually prosecute them.
TABLE 13
STATUS OF STATE CHARGES AT TIME OF FEDERAL DECISION TO
DECLINE IN FAVOR OF STATE PROSECUTION

S

Cd0
0~-

~bC

SCS

0
CS
0

05
-

U'C

Status of State Charges

C
Z

Z~
0

r.

0i

.,~

04

4

)

C

8

4

29

13

13

Prosecution pending

54

43

16

9

36

Defendant arrested
but not charged

25

26

11

69

Under investigation,
known suspect

4

13

33

5

11

Under investigation,
no suspect

0

7

4

0

2

Not indicated

9

7

7

5

7

100

100

100

101

100

Already convicted

Total b
NOTE: Sample size-

City of Chicago
Other Cook County
Other Northern District
Out-of-State
All Defendants

a

31

64
16
28
23
131

a Over one-half of these defendants were in possession of an automobile stolen
in another state when they were arrested by Chicago police. The fact that they
were in custody thus does not necessarily signify that the out-of-state authorities
were likely to prosecute. See text at note 67 supra.
b Because of rounding, not all totals equal 100%.

the witnesses) to prosecute the theft itself. See Table 13, note a infra. One study of the
disposition of. interstate car thieves arrested by Chicago police found that the most common
reason for nonprosecution in Chicago was the refusal of the out-of-state owner of the car to
come in and testify. J. Spiotto, How to Succeed in Crime Without Being Tried: A Study of
Interstate Auto Theft 16-17 (Apr. 5, 1971) (unpublished paper at The University of Chicago
Law School).
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State Prosecution Follow-up in Chicago Courts

In an effort to obtain more complete information on the status
of state prosecutions, an attempt was made to follow up these declinations in local courts to see how many were prosecuted, on what
charges, and with what results. The pilot study was limited to defendants involved in the city of Chicago, since that jurisdiction accounted for the largest block of defendants and was located closest
to our research center. Owing to certain methodological problems,
we decided to narrow further our focus to those state charges that
were based on the same criminal acts as the federal offenses. e8
Even with this narrowed focus, a failure to find any record of the
defendant in the Circuit Court of Cook County does not necessarily mean an absence of prosecution efforts. Indeed, in a few cases
it is possible that the defendant was prosecuted in another jurisdiction. Thus, the estimated prosecution rates reported below are
understated, although probably not by a substantial margin.
The results of our pilot follow-up study were as follows: as of
June 30, 1976,9 eight matters (involving eleven defendants) appeared to have been prosecuted, which represents a state prosecution rate of 22% for matters and ,23% for defendants. Of the
eleven defendants, six were convicted and received sentences ranging from three-years probation to two-years imprisonment. One
defendant had been dismissed by the State's Attorney's office, one
:8 As previously noted, prosecution of a defendant is sometimes declined in favor of
more serious, or completely unrelated, state charges, see text at notes 66-67 supra, and the
U.S. Attorney's files do not always indicate the details of such charges. Tracing the treatment of the same criminal episode in state courts was extremely difficult since our principal
sources of information were the defendant's name, the date of offense, and the details of the
offense; we did not have access to any unique identifying number for offenders or offenses.
Following up on the particular unrelated state charges for which the federal authorities declined prosecution would have been nearly impossible.
Our primary method of access to the state court records was a search of the docket
records in the offices of the State's Attorney for Cook County. Whenever a combination of
defendant name, offense, and date of filing suggested a possible "match" with a defendant
in our sample, we checked the circuit court file for the details of the offense and the offender. It was thus possible to eliminate state court cases that were totally unrelated to the
criminal offense charged in our sample. The docket records, as well as those maintained by
the circuit court itself, however, were sometimes improperly or illegibly indexed, so it is
possible that our manual retrieval efforts overlooked some defendants who were prosecuted
in Cook County. In an effort to double-check our findings in the case of defendants arrested
by the Chicago police, we requested access to the Police Department's arrest and criminal
history records, which generally indicate the disposition of charges related to a given arrest.
Despite assurances of confidentiality and anonymity of all findings, the request was denied.
69 This date was 27 months after the last matter in our sample was received by the U.S.
Attorney's office. See text at note 30 supra.
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was acquitted, one jumped bail, and two were still pending. These
last two defendants had filed an appeal contesting the legality of
the search l6ading to their arrest for possession of heroin. 0
Since there are instances in which neither federal nor state
prosecution is desirable, our inquiry must be refined still further to
focus on the declination of federal prosecution in favor of state
prosecution where the suspect was apparently convictable. If we
exclude from the Chicago sample declinations by the U.S. Attorney
based on convictability reasons, the state prosecution rate, for both
cases and defendants, actually falls to 18% .7
Due to the many methodological difficulties encountered in
the pilot study in Chicago, we did not pursue a thorough follow-up
study of state prosecution cases. Moreover, the results of the Chicago study must be viewed as tentative, in light of these methodological problems. Nevertheless, on the basis of these results it
seems very unlikely that even one-half of the "state prosecution"
declinations are successfully prosecuted in state court. Whether
this represents a problem of underenforcement depends upon one's
view of optimum enforcement levels. Because we have no comparable data on Cook County prosecution rates by type of offense,
amount of loss or contraband, or the like, it is impossible even to
say whether the prosecution rates implied by the sample data are
typical of state cases in general. If they are typical, one might well
inquire whether state prosecution rates are adequate. If, on the
other hand, state cases not involving possible federal charges are
generally prosecuted at a higher rate, the results of our pilot study
may reflect problems that are peculiar to cases with overlapping
state/federal jurisdiction. The possibility that these cases tend to
"fall into a crack" is worthy of further investigation.

VII.

THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

This study has shown that the decision to file federal criminal
charges is highly selective. Less than one-fifth of the matters received by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District resulted in
the filing of formal charges in U.S. District Court, and the prosecution ratio for matters with a sufficient basis to obtain a conviction
70 It is interesting to note that the U.S. Attorney declined this case in part because of
the questionable search. Similarly, prosecution of the defendant who was dismissed by the
state's attorney's office was also declined partly because of an illegal search.
71 The rate falls because state authorities prosecuted a higher proportion of referrals
with such convictability problems.
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was only slightly higher than one out of four.7 2 Analysis of declination reasons and the characteristics of declined and prosecuted
cases reveals fairly clear-cut criteria that shape the decision to
prosecute federal offenses in the Northern District. A large number
of declinations were based in whole or in part on evidentiary or
legal obstacles to prosecution; this traditional basis for pretrial
screening accounted for 45% of the declinations studied. About
two-thirds of the remaining declinations involved the use of an alternative to federal prosecution (most often state or local prosecution), and the rest-18% of all declinations-were based entirely*
on policy considerations, especially the perceived triviality of the
offense. Triviality was a factor, however, in a much larger proportion of cases-44% of the total-and many of the declinations in
favor of state prosecution appear to have been based on policy reasons rather than the choice of an effective alternative to federal
prosecution. Looking at the characteristics of particular cases,
those involving multiple defendants or conspiracy charges were
particularly likely to be prosecuted, and certain other kinds of
cases-violent offenses, mail theft, and sales of hard drugs, particularly heroin-also received prosecution priority. Larger amounts
of drugs and higher dollar amounts of loss were associated with
higher prosecution rates. When the decision to prosecute was examined by screening stages, it was found that the factors above
were generally applied in an efficient manner; except for certain
declinations involving a magistrate proceeding, cases and defendapparants were generally weeded out as soon as it was reasonably
74
ent that the requirements for prosecution were lacking.
These findings raise a number of important policy issues. The
frequent dismissal of charges, and the frequent referral of apparently guilty defendants to uncertain state prosecution or to noncriminal alternatives, raises fundamental questions regarding what
behavior should be criminally prosecuted and by whom. If agreement can be reached on these difficult issues, there is a further
question whether effective mechanisms can be found to regulate
prosecutorial discretion so that desirable policies are implemented
consistently, efficiently, and fairly. Finally, studies of the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion have important implications for the
analysis and reform of other criminal justice processes, particularly
plea bargaining and sentencing.
text at note 175 infra.
See text at notes 66-67 supra.
74 This is explored in greater detail in Appendix C infra.
712See
73
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A comprehensive analysis of the issues raised above is beyond
the scope of this article; each is at least a book-length topic. Nor
can the dat6 in this study conclusively answer the important empirical questions that underlie these policy issues.
Thus, our research should be viewed as a pilot study, demonstrating the kinds of prosecution policies that more detailed investigations could expect to uncover, and the research methods necessary to document and analyze them. What follows is a brief
discussion of the major policy issues, in light of our preliminary
-findings, and some suggestions for future research.
A.

Evaluating Federal Prosecution Rates

1. Who Should be Prosecuted? Do the highly selective prosecution policies revealed in this study mean that some federal offenses are underenforced? Should Congress immediately appropriate a billion dollars for a "war" on federal crime? Are the existing,
limited prosecutorial resources being allocated so as to achieve the
greatest benefit? Our data raise, but do not answer, these important issues. It is simply not possible, given our present state of
knowledge, to define the "optimum" prosecution rates for different
offenses and offenders. For one thing, we lack corresponding data
on the rates and reasons for declination by state prosecutors, who
are often seeking to control the same criminal behavior.7 We also
lack information on the effectiveness of existing state and federal
prosecution rates in terms of deterrence, educative effects of the
law, and incapacitation or rehabilitation of offenders. Most importantly, we know little about utility of different prosecution rates in
achieving these goals. Depending on the shape of the marginal utility curve for federal prosecutions, it may be that only very large
increases in prosecution rates would achieve measurably greater
effects.
Unfortunately, we are not likely to obtain definitive data any
time in the near future. In the absence of such data, however, it
should not be assumed that current levels of enforcement are too
low, or that additional resources would lead to generally higher
prosecution rates. To take the latter point first, it seems clear that
the low prosecution rates in the Northern District-in all 94 federal districts, for that matter-are not simply a reflection of re76 Our pilot study of matters referred to state prosecution in Chicago courts suggests
that state prosecution rates may also be quite low. See text at notes 68-71 supra. See also
authorities cited note 10 supra.
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source scarcity. From 1971 to 1975, the number of Assistant U.S.
Attorneys in the Northern District increased 76%, while the total
number of cases filed (civil and criminal, including appeals) only
increased 12%; criminal cases filed actually declined 10% .76 (For
the nation as a whole, manpower increased 64%, total cases filed
increased 16%, and criminal filings increased 2% .11) In the Northern District, most of this additional manpower was used to support
a major campaign against bribery and other forms of public corruption that had not previously been prosecuted by state and local
agencies.7 8 Such "special" prosecutions are extremely labor intensive and, judging by the total number of cases filed during the period, they absorbed practically all additional resources devoted to
criminal matters. Thus, it seems likely that further increases in
federal prosecutorial resources would not substantially alter many
of the prosecution criteria we have observed. Trivial cases are not
declined for lack of manpower, but because a policy decision has
been made that these cases do not require criminal prosecution, at
79
least in federal court.
But how can such selective enforcement policies be justified?
Are not the existing enforcement levels so low that they must be
deemed inadequate irrespective of what the "marginal utility" data
would show? The answer may depend upon one's views of the purposes of punishment. If one believes that punishment is imposed
to achieve retribution (and not simply limited by retributive or
other normative principles),80 then current federal prosecution
rates must be considered inadequate. Without doubt, large numbers of federal offenders escape retribution in federal court, and
our limited data on referrals to state prosecution suggest that punishment is not provided there either.
The alternative, utilitarian goals of punishment all permit
considerable selectivity in prosecution. Incapacitation, for example,
71 U.S. ATTORNEYS' OFFICE STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 27, Tables 1 & 6; id. (1972);
id. (1973); id. (1974); id. (1975).
17 See authorities cited note 76 supra.
71 For a description of some of the campaigns in this and other districts, see [1974] U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6-7; Ruff, supra note 13, at 1172, 1176-78, 11841201.
11 It could be argued that "trivial" cases are simply seen as much less important than
"special" prosecutions, and that they would be prosecuted, given unlimited resources. We
cannot evaluate this claim directly, but the manpower data summarized in the text suggest
that the "priority" attached to such cases is so low that it approaches the vanishing point.
In any case, resources are limited, whereas the supply of potential "special" prosecutions
apparently is not, at least in Chicago.
80 See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-80 (1974).
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is only necessary if (1) we can predict future criminality on the
part of the defendant, and (2) we can also expect that the criminal
sanction will prevent (or at least postpone) future crimes. Defendants not meeting these criteria need not, from a purely incapacitative perspective, be either prosecuted or punished. Similarly, the
rehabilitative and special-deterrence rationales only require prosecution of defendants who are both likely to commit further crimes
and who are "treatable." A general-deterrence rationale might permit even greater selectivity: to the extent that potential violators
of the law in question are highly "risk averse ' 8 1 with respect to
criminal sanctions, a relatively low level of detection and enforcement may provide substantial deterrence. This might be true, for
example, among income tax offenders.82 As for the "standard-setting" function of prosecution, however, selective prosecution may
only be effective if the fact of selectivity is less widely publicized
than the sanctions imposed. An occasional prosecution serves to
remind the public that certain behaviors are considered "wrong";
but if the public is also aware of similar, unprosecuted cases, the
seeming unfairness or inconsistency of society's formal condemnation process may lessen or even eliminate the "moralizing" impact
of the occasional prosecution.
The potential unfairness of selective enforcement is itself an
important aspect of the system, which may invalidate. prosecution
policies that would adequately serve utilitarian aims. There are,
however, several kinds of selective enforcement. The policy of
prosecuting only the most serious violators, which was frequently
applied in the Northern District, may be the least offensive example of selective enforcement. Although offenders charged with the
''same crime" are being treated differently, most people would view
such discrimination as deserved, because the prosecuted offender
has committed a more serious offense. A more problematic form of
selectivity is totally unrelated to culpability: certain violators are
selected because they occupy positions that make them more visi81 This concept is used by proponents of economic analysis to account for the differen-

tial impact of the same punishment on potential violators. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 174-79 (1968).
82 Over 80 million individual income tax returns were filed in 1966, of which about 3
million were audited. From these and other leads, the Intelligence Divisions of the 58 dis-

trict offices of the IRS conducted about 9,000 preliminary investigations into possible criminal violations, and 2,000 full-scale investigations. These investigations resulted in fewer than
700 criminal cases. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 113-15 (1967). See also
note 17 supra.
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ble, thus giving the prosecutor more deterrence for the same expenditure. Unfortunately, such selectivity may also result in penalizing defendants for being public officials, accountants, or even for
exercising free-speech rights.83 A third form of selectivity is not
based on any particular criterion: defendants are selected at random because only a few are needed to achieve deterrent aims, or
because resources are insufficient to permit prosecution of all offenders. Such "arbitrary" selection raises greater potential risks
that the prosecutor will "randomly" select his enemies, but some
would say that inconsistency itself is an evil even if the prosecutor
chooses blindly. If this view becomes more widely held (and recent
"determinate" sentencing reforms suggest that "consistency" is an
increasingly important policy consideration 4), it could place major
limitations on the use of selective prosecution practices.
The current trend in federal prosecution, however, is toward
greater selectivity.8 5 One factor that has accelerated this change is
the recognition that noncriminal alternatives to prosecution may
serve the aims of punishment as well as or better than criminal
penalties. The three-level classification of declination reasons used
in this study-convictability, alternatives, and policy-reflected
our belief, apparently shared by federal prosecutors in the Northern District, that criminal penalties should be seen as a "last resort" among society's arsenal of available responses to "criminal"
behavior. Formal prosecution should only be pursued when there is
no strong policy argument against prosecution and no effective alternative means of achieving the goals of prosecution.8 6 The clearest case involves the availability of alternative criminal penalties-for example, revocation of parole or probation, other charges
in the same district, charges in another federal district, or state
83

See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding the policy

of singling out vocal tax protesters who openly refuse to file a return).
84

See, e.g.,

TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND

CERTAIN PUNISHMENT

3-9 (1976).

The Department of Justice has increasingly encouraged local U.S. Attorneys to concentrate on major, complex cases. See [1973] U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 8.
8

Cf. 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2066-67 (Oct. 18, 1978) (Attorney General Bell listed top four
Department priorities as white-collar crime, public corruption, narcotics, and organized
crime). The available data on nationwide prosecution rates show a gradual decrease in the
period from 1971 to 1978, even though the number of matters received by U.S Attorneys

each year was also decreasing. See Table 1 supra.
86 Both of the recent national crime commissions strongly recommended increased "diPRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

version" from formal criminal processes.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

supra note 4, at 133-34; U.S.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON

supra note 2, Standard 2.1, at 32.
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charges. Such alternatives will often provide equivalent or greater
degrees of incapacitation or rehabilitation, and, for the reasons
previously suggested, the deterrent and standard-setting functions
of the law may be adequately served by selective prosecution of
those defendants for whom alternatives are not available.
Even where no alternative criminal penalties exist, the utilitarian aims of the law may be achieved through the application of
civil remedies, administrative regulation, pretrial diversion programs, or restitution. Of course, the availability of an alternative to
criminal prosecution does not necessarily mean that prosecution
would be inappropriate, but it changes the question: one should
then ask whether the added value of the criminal process or sanction is worth any added costs of prosecution. The important point
to keep in mind in deciding whether to prosecute is simply that,
unless one is a strict "retributivist," any of these alternatives may
be valid; the existence of a criminal penalty does not necessarily
mean that it must be invoked.
2. Who Should Prosecute?Even if criminal penalties or stigmatization are considered necessary, there is a further question as
to which unit of government should administer them. Historically,
the "police" power in the United States was considered a function
of state and local government, since it was not among the enumerated powers specifically granted to the federal government in article I of the Constitution. 7 The federal government, however, was
soon recognized to have at least the limited police authority "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated powers.8 8 Over the
years, more and more federal criminal laws were enacted, based on
increasingly broad interpretations of federal jurisdiction. 9 Today,
there is substantial overlap between state and federal criminal jurisdiction, but neither Congress nor the states have yet enacted
legislative standards to determine when prosecution should be referred to other authorities. 90 The proposed federal criminal code
07 The historical development of federal criminal jurisdiction is discussed in Schwartz,
supra note 13, at 64-66.
88 Id. at 64-65.
89 Id. at 65-66.

980A few federal crimes include limitations that may reflect a desire to limit federal
incursions into state criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1) (1976) (requiring
special certification and approval by the Attorney General to prosecute certain civil rights
offenses). See also notes 54, 61 supra. The federal juvenile delinquency statutes also reflect
a strong policy in favor of state prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976) (prohibiting federal
court proceedings unless the Attorney General certifies that state authorities (1) cannot or
will not take jurisdiction, or (2) do not have adequate programs and services).

1980]

Federal ProsecutorialDiscretion

drafted by the Brown Commission in 1970 contained explicit standards to guide federal declinations in favor of state prosecution,"1
but these provisions were not included in the revised bill subsequently passed by the Senate in 1977,9 and the standards contained in the 1979 Senate version provide only limited guidance. 3
At the same time, the original code, proposed by the Brown Commission, and to a lesser extent the Senate bills, might actually increase the already broad scope of federal criminal jurisdiction.94
Thus, it seems particularly important to consider what kinds of
cases the U.S. Attorney should handle, and which cases should be
left to state or local prosecutors.
The clearest case for federal prosecution would seem to involve crimes with no direct state counterpart,95 such as federal tax,
Selective Service, immigration, customs, perjury in federal court,
contempt of federal court, failure to appear in federal court, escape
from federal prison, bribery of federal officials, crimes committed
at sea or within federal enclaves with exclusive federal jurisdiction,
violations of federal administrative or regulatory laws, counterfeiting, or certain civil rights violations. 96 As the present study indicates, however, these offenses are not always given the highest
prosecution priority, even when evidentiary problems are taken
into account.9 7 Federal prosecutors appear to give as much or more
attention to offenses that are also prosecutable, at least in theory,
by state and local prosecutors.
See text and note at note 99 infra.
" S. 1437, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977). This bill, however, did contain a provision permitting the U.S. Attorney General to suspend state or local jurisdiction over certain offenses
(for example, the murder of a federal official). Id. § 205.
" See text at note 103 infra.
" The extent to which the Senate bill, S. 1437, would have created, or at least legitimated, broader federal jurisdiction was a hotly debated question in the hearings held by the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. See Federal Criminal Code Reform: The Jurisdiction Issue, [1978] 23 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 11 (Supp.). For a discussion of the jurisdictional provisions in the Brown Commission Code, see Abrams, Consultant's Report on
91

Jurisdiction,in 1 WORKING PAPERS
CRIMINAL LAWS 33-67 (1970).

OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL

" This group of cases corresponds closely to what Professor Schwartz called the federal
"self-defensive" criminal jurisdiction. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 66-70. The two concepts,
however, are not identical. Some "self-defensive" laws (for example, mail theft) punish acts
that could be adequately handled under existing state law. On the other hand, certain offenses that do not directly threaten the federal government need to be prosecuted federally
because no state counterpart exists (for example, crimes committed at sea, or within federal
enclaves).
For example, deprivation of federal voting rights, as opposed to violations that are
often offenses under state laws, such as police brutality.
97 See Tables 3, 10 supra.
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Where concurrent jurisdiction exists, how should federal prosecutors define their authority? What makes an offense a "federal
case"? In 1948, Professor Louis Schwartz proposed the following
criteria to guide the assertion of such "auxiliary" federal criminal
jurisdiction:
[I]n general it can be said that federal action is justified in the
presence of one or more of the following circumstances: (1)
When the states are unable or unwilling to act; (2) when the
jurisdictional feature, e.g., use of the mails, is not merely incidental or accidental to the offense, but an important ingredient of its success; (3) when, although the particular jurisdictional feature is incidental, another substantial federal
interest is protected by the assertion of federal power; (4)
when the criminal operation extends into a number of states,
transcending the local interest of any one; (5) when it would
be inefficient administration to refer to state authorities a
complicated case investigated and developed on the theory of
federal prosecution. 8
In 1970, the Brown Commission, of which Schwartz was the staff
director, recommended that a somewhat different version of these
standards be included in the proposed new federal criminal code:
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal law enforcement agencies are authorized to decline or discontinue federal enforcement efforts whenever the offense can
effectively be prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it appears that there is no substantial Federal interest in further
prosecution or .thatthe offense primarily affects state, local or
foreign interests. A substantial federal interest exists in the
following circumstances, among others: (a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is impeded by interstate aspects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is believed
to be necessary to vindicate federally-protected civil rights; (c)
if federal jurisdiction exists under section 201(b) [pendent
jurisdiction], the offense is closely related to the underlying
offense, as to which there is a substantial federal interest; (d)
an offense apparently limited in its impact is believed to be
associated with organized criminal activities extending beyond
state lines; (e) state or local law enforcement has been so cor-

98 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 73 (footnote omitted).
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rupted as to undermine its effectiveness substantially.99
It is noteworthy that the Commission version permits federal prosecution of any case, and only restricts declinations, whereas the
original Schwartz version appears to start with the premise that
state jurisdiction is primary, and that federal jurisdiction is appropriate only if certain conditions are met.10 0
The two versions agree that each of the following factors supports federal jurisdiction: (1) the offense cannot be effectively prosecuted by local authorities; (2) there is a "substantial federal interest" in the prosecution; or (3) the offense involves several states,
and transcends local interests. The term "substantial federal interest" may only restate the basic policy question, but the Commission's language, quoted above, provides some additional guidance
by listing examples of circumstances that create a "substantial federal interest"-for example, organized criminal activities extending
beyond state lines. 10 1
Except for the emphasis on organized crime, these criteria do
n6t correspond closely to existing prosecution policy in the Northern District. The ineffectiveness of state prosecution efforts may
account for some filings-for example, charges of bribery and extortion against powerful local officials, or prosecution of large-scale,
interstate conspiracies-but it does not guarantee that an offense
will be federally prosecuted. Perhaps the fault is with the standards, however, or with the breadth of federal criminal statutes.
There are certainly some minor cases that arguably do not belong
in federal court, regardless how corrupt or ineffective state systems
may be. 10 2 The present study suggests that such a de minimis principle is broadly applied in the Northern District, and may account
for as much as one-half of the declination rate.

99

NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT

19 (1971).

See also Abrams, supra note 94.
100 The Schwartz formulation thus discourages federal prosecution in two ways: (1) if a
positive factor (for example, state unable to act) is present, federal action is "justified" but
not required, as it apparently would be under the Commission code; (2) if the same factor is
not present, federal prosecution is barred under the Schwartz formulation, but is still possible under the Commission code.
,0, Some of the other examples provided by the Commission (civil rights and local corruption) appear redundant, given the first principle cited-that declination is inappropriate
if the offense cannot be effectively prosecuted by local authorities. See text at note 103
infra.
,02 Another problem with the "ineffectiveness" principle is that nonprosecution in state
courts could, in some cases, represent a legitimate policy decision by local authorities that
prosecution is undesirable-for instance, in obscenity cases. Arguably, there should be some
limit to the authority of federal prosecutors to "overrule" such intentional value choices.
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It is unclear whether the other two criteria contained in both
sets of standards are applied in the Northern District. The absence
of "interstate impact" is almost never cited directly as a reason for
declination, 10 3 although it is possible that "state prosecution" declinations include many cases seen as purely local. Nor do the declination memoranda speak of "federal interest" in the prosecution.
Again, perhaps the fault is with the standards: except for a few
offenses directed at federal agencies or programs, it is difficult to
say that any crime-even organized crime-involves a peculiarly
"federal" interest, let alone a "substantial" one, provided that
state and local authorities are able and willing to prosecute. Similarly, why does the fact that an offense "extends into a number of
states" justify federal prosecution, if effective state prosecution is
available? Both of these formulas probably derive from constitutional concepts that are now outdated; 104 on a law enforcement
policy level, they beg the question. If these two factors are discarded, the rather complex criteria proposed by Schwartz and the
Brown Commission can be reduced to two. Federal auxiliary jurisdiction is appropriate when state authorities are unable' 015 or unwilling'"6 to act, and when some minimum level of seriousness is
established. 07 Neither of these criteria is self-defining, of course,
but they avoid the use of empty formalisms bearing no relationship
to the actual need for federal auxiliary jurisdiction.'08
103
104

See Table 6 supra.
Broad expansion of the commerce and other federal powers has almost eliminated

constitutional limitations on federal criminal jurisdiction. See Abrams, supra note 94, at 3639; Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics and Prospects,41 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 18 (1977). In any case, whatever the current or future constitutional
limiting principles may be, they need not form the basis for policy decisions about how
much of the federal power to exercise.
10l A major reason why state authorities are unable to prosecute effectively relates to

the difficulty of obtaining witnesses from out of state. See Abrams, supra note 94, at 53.
106 This includes not only cases in which local law enforcement has been corrupted or
refuses to protect certain citizens, but also those in which the offense is too minor, from the
point of view of each affected state jurisdiction, to motivate state authorities to act.
107 The last clause of this sentence is needed in the unlikely event that existing federal
prosecutorial resources are increased substantially. See text at note 102 supra. As a practical matter, however, federal prosecutors are unlikely to be interested in trivial cases.
108 On the other hand, such formalisms may be much easier to administer, or may cause
less day-to-day friction with state and local authorities. But if separate state and federal
"spheres of interest" are to be posited, one would think that this should be done along lines
that, as much as possible, relate to the need for federal assistance in certain types of offenses. One approach would be simply to define certain areas of law enforcement as "federal," at least above some de minimis level. The current federal emphasis on white-collar,
public-corruption, narcotics, and organized crime may reflect a move in this direction. See
note 85 supra.
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Whether present practices conform to these two criteria cannot be determined from the data in this study, although the
strength of the de minimis policy in the Northern District suggests
that this factor predominates. If so, such "skimming" of the most
serious cases raises a double problem: local prosecutors and state
attorneys general may be capable of handling some of the more
serious offenses, while they may be unable to deal with some less
serious ones-such as interstate vehicle theft. 10 9 At a minimum,
the present study suggests the need for greater coordination between state and federal prosecutors, and more research into the
specific criteria being used to establish the current division of
labor.
As this article goes to press, Congress is considering yet another set of guidelines for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Senate Bill 1722110 lists the following "factors" that federal authorities
"should consider" in cases involving concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction:
(1) the relative gravity of the federal offense and the State
or local offense;
(2) the relative interest in federal investigation or
prosecution;
(3) the resources available to-the federal authorities and the
State or local authorities;
(4) the traditional role of the federal authorities and the
State and local authorities with respect to the offense;
(5) the interests of federalism; and
(6) any other relevant factor.""
Unlike both the Schwartz formulation and the Brown Commission
recommendations previously discussed, this latest provision would
be purely advisory; it neither requires nor prohibits federal prosecution of any particular case.
As for the "factors" listed in S. 1722, there appears to be a
major emphasis on the question-begging "federal interest" concept
(factors 2 and 5), and there is no direct mention of the "state ineffectiveness" criterion proposed in earlier standards, though the
first and third factors cited may indirectly reflect this criterion.
These factors indicate that less severe state penalties might justify
109 The available evidence suggests that these offenses are rarely enforced, even against
adults, because out-of-state witnesses will not come in. See note 67 supra.
110 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (as introduced by Sen. Kennedy, Sept. 7, 1979).
"I Id. § 205(b).
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federal charges despite the availability of state prosecution. One
can question the value of this provision, however, so long as Congress can increase the penalties for concurrent-jurisdiction offenses.1 12 As for the reverse situation (where the state penalty is
greater than the federal), this new provision is unnecessary; if the
state is unable to prosecute, federal prosecution seems desirable,
and if the state does act, the general rule proposed in this article
prevents federal prosecution without resort to the "relative gravity" concept. To summarize, the concurrent-jurisdiction provisions
of S. 1722 are useful insofar as they clarify the "state ineffectiveness" rule where state prosecution of a less serious charge is available; beyond this, the bill neither clarifies nor resolves the difficult
policy questions involved.
B.

Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion

We now shift from ends to means, or what might be called the
"procedural" aspects of the discretion problem: given a set of value
choices about which cases should be prosecuted by whom, what
mechanisms can be devised to ensure that these choices are consistently and fairly implemented in everyday practice?
The most far-reaching approach would be to redefine the substantive federal criminal law so that it corresponds to either existing or ideal prosecution policy, thus substantially narrowing the
scope of prosecutorial discretion.1 1 After all, if certain offenses are
almost never prosecuted, why should they be part of the criminal
code? In some cases-where the offense is archaic, for example-repeal seems in order, but there are several reasons why it
may be difficult to redraft the more typical, partially enforced federal criminal statute. First, to the extent that the "state ineffectiveness" criterion proposed above is applied, substantive law
probably cannot define a single, nationwide standard; the specific
cases that local authorities cannot or will not effectively prosecute
vary greatly from district to district, and also vary over time within
any given district. Second, there are certain law enforcement con112

See also note 102 supra.

"' Such an approach might be modeled on the West German system of "compulsory"
prosecution, in which prosecutors are required to file charges for any felony for which there
is a "sufficient factual basis." See Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 443 (1974). Such a system presupposes that, except for evidentiary problems, all acts covered by the language of the criminal code should be criminally prosecuted.
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siderations that are independent of prosecution criteria; particularly in the areas of drugs, counterfeiting, illegal weapons, and stolen property, it is often necessary to arrest and interrogate
defendants who could easily be prosecuted in state courts, or who
fall well below the normal de minimis cut-off point, but who have
information about more widespread operations. 1 14 For both of
these reasons, it may prove quite difficult to draft narrower substantive laws of long-term, nationwide applicability. 1 5
Given the apparent necessity for statutes that leave room for
the broad exercise of discretion, how can this discretion be kept
within acceptable limits? This is an important concern of supervising prosecutors, since they must see that their subordinates are
carrying out office policies. Moreover, even in a one-person office,
the prosecutor may wish to take steps to ensure both that individual decisions are justified and consistent over time, and that such
decisions are perceived by outsiders as proper. Finally, from the
perspective of the public, there must be some mechanism by which
elected or appointed prosecutors may be held accountable for their
decisions.
There are a number of procedural devices that have been suggested as means for controlling prosecutorial discretion, including
the use of written reasons for each decision" 6 (with or without dissemination to complainants or defendants); administrative review
by supervising prosecutors, 1 1 7 routinely, or upon "appeal" by the
victim or defendant; computerized case-management systems;"'
promulgation of written rules or guidelines for the exercise of discretion; 1 9 involvement of defense attorneys in a "pre-charge" con" See text at note 211 infra.
115 These two problems may also limit the feasibility of binding administrative guide-

lines, at least at the national level. As to the administrative rulemaking approach, see text
and notes at notes 134-144 infra.
I" See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 188-214. See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN
EUROPE AND AMERICA 73 (1976).
M1'
See K. DAVIS, supra note 116, at 73-74. See also Rabin, supra note 8 (suggesting
that the Department of Justice should review prosecution policies in each of the 94 districts,
based on quarterly reports of the rates and reasons for declination, by offense).
"1s See Watts & Work, Developing an Automated Information System for the Prosecutor, 9 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 164 (1970).
"I' See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 15-21; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 134; U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 2, Standard 1.2, at 24; Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 1-25
(1971); Beck, supra note 13, at 311-45.
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ference; 120 and judicial review of decisions for or against
prosecution.' 2 '
1. The Written-Reasons-and-Review Approach. The office
we studied used a system of written reasons, routinely reviewed by
supervising prosecutors within the office. Although there were no
written office guidelines, and little formal "indoctrination" of new
assistants as to office policies, this system appeared to produce
fairly consistent 22 results, without raising any of the problems said
to be associated with the use of published guidelines or judicial
review, such as greater delay, loss of privacy and confidentiality of
23
investigative files, and lessened deterrence in low-priority cases.
Such a system is also fairly inexpensive. With an annual total of
about four thousand matters.declined in the Northern District, one
supervising attorney could read all declination memoranda and attached files in two or three working hours per day; 2 4 a system of
"spot checking" some of the files, to see that the reasons have a
sufficient factual basis, would require even less supervisory time
and would probably be equally effective. Thus, the proposed use of
sophisticated computerized case-management systems to aid in
making prosecution decisions 125 may not be necessary in an operation of this size; the majority of declinations are so self-evident
that they are identified on the day of referral to the Criminal Division, and the remaining caseload appears to be sufficiently small,
given the available manpower, to permit individualized, case-bycase evaluation by assistants and their supervisors. Although computerized systems can be quite useful for other management purposes, the decision to prosecute can be entrusted to nonelectronic

02See ALI

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE

§ 320.1

(1975); PRESIDENT'S

COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE

COURTS 7-8 (1967).
121 See text at note 146 infra.
2 There were, however, a few exceptions. For example, one defendant was prosecuted
for a mail theft involving a welfare check worth $157, whereas prosecution of most nonpostal employee suspects charged with stealing such a small amount were declined. (This
case was eventually dismissed on the government's motion.) There may have been other
cases of inconsistency that were not apparent from the files we examined, but the number of
such cases could not be too large; if it were, we would not be able to recognize the clear
patterns of prosecution policy that emerged.
123 See generally Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375,
380 (2d Cir. 1973).
"I' This estimate assumes an average expenditure of five to ten minutes per declination,
18 declinations per day, 220 days per year.
125 See Watts & Work, supra note 118.
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brains, at least in a small-to-medium-sized office with a single
supervisor."'
The use of the reasons-and-review approach, however, has its
limitations. For one thing, there are certain reasons that cannot
always be verified by reading the file; if the assistant says "Witness
X told me she is unwilling to testify," the supervisor will probably
not take the time to talk to the witness personally in any but the
most serious cases. Still, if supervisors let their assistants know
that such double-checking is sometimes done, and that any discrepancies will be dealt with severely, the file review should generally suffice. Another way to keep the assistants honest is to provide
the victims and investigating agent with a copy of the declination
memorandum, and to encourage them to discuss the case with the
127
supervising prosecutor.

A further limitation of the reasons-and-review approach is
that, in the absence of underlying "rules" of decision, 128 it is difficult for supervisors to base their review on objective criteria. For
example, if the reason for declination is "small amount of loss" in
an interstate theft case, and the file merely confirms that the estimated loss was $550, the supervisor needs a firm rule for deciding
whether the assistant's decision was correct. In the absence of such
a rule, the supervisor must decide whether or not $550 makes such
a case "too minor," substituting his or her ad hoc reaction to the
facts for that of the assistant. There is thus no guarantee that the
supervisor's decisions will be consistent over time, and no way for
the assistant to know what will be approved next time. 12

All this is not to say, however, that a reasons-and-review approach without such rules is worthless, only that the process works
more efficiently with them. In fact, in the example above, the supervisor is applying a rule of sorts: a very low dollar amount of loss
may make a case unprosecutable. Such a rule-we will call it a
nonquantifiable "factor"-does give the assistant some guidance,
and promotes consistency in decisions. Over time, a factor may
24 An office with a caseload requiring two or more supervisors to review declinations
could present an entirely different situation, since they might very well hold inconsistent
policy views.
27 See text at notes 132-133 infra.
128 See text at notes 134-144 infra.
"I Cf. Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 883, 933 (1977) (arguing
that reasons for a judicially imposed sentence are useful only if they provide a "full explanation" for the decision, and "when they refer to operating rules that translate mitigating and
aggravating circumstances into points on a sentencing scale").
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evolve into a rule, as supervisors conclude that the dividing line
between declinations and prosecutions tends to fall around $500.
Moreover, even if the policy-formulation process has not
progressed to the stage of articulated factors, they may emerge
from the process of reason giving; thus, reasons evolve into factors,
and factors evolve into rules.
Another difficulty with the reasons approach arises when there
is more than one reason given for the decision. The present study
shows that prosecutors frequently articulate two or three distinct
reasons for declination, and this is true even when we "collapse"
similar groups of reasons together. Such combinations pose
problems for prosecutors as well as for researchers, because they
are ambiguous: Are any of the reasons considered self-sufficient? Is
no one sufficient, meaning that two or more are necessary to support the decision? From a research standpoint, these ambiguities
make it harder to state with confidence the real reason for a decision. Similarly, assistant and supervising prosecutors may interpret
the stated reasons for a particular decision differently, which interferes with the feedback process by which policy is developed and
passed down the chain of command. One solution to this problem
is for assistants to cite all reasons that they believe support the
decision, but to identify which, if any, are deemed self-sufficient.
Supervisors may then return the memorandum with any necessary
corrections as to policy errors, even if the decision has been
affirmed.
Despite these limitations, the use of written reasons for prosecution decisions, which are routinely reviewed by supervising attorneys, seems the minimum requirement for effective control of prosecution decisions. Without such reasons, there is little basis for -any
other form of review, whether by higher level prosecutors, such as
the Department of Justice, or by the courts. Nor does there appear
to be any reason why the affirmative decision to prosecute could
not be documented and reviewed in the same manner as declinations were in the Northern District.130 The reasons for prosecution
will usually (but not always) be the opposite of reasons for declination, in which case the decision to prosecute merely represents the
absence of any of the latter reasons. Such a decision, however,
should be reviewed by supervising prosecutors just as carefully as
110 At the time of our study, decisions to prosecute were formalized internally by "prosecution memoranda," but these contained discussions of proof requirements and problems
rather than policy reasons justifying prosecution.
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declination decisions, and the review process is facilitated by articulation of the reasons for the decision.1 3'
Although such reasons are a necessary condition for effective
control of prosecution decisions, they may not be sufficient for that
purpose. To the extent that supervisors do not take their review
job seriously, or wish to conceal the real reasons for these decisions, inconsistency and unfairness are likely to result. Moreover, if
the reasons do not develop beyond the level of guiding factors, it
may be impossible for even well-intentioned supervisors to determine that abuse or inconsistency has occurred. Finally, the appearance of fairness, as well as fairness in fact, is an important policy
goal, and one which may not be achieved through informal selfregulation. Thus it is necessary to consider some of the other regulatory mechanisms listed at the outset.
Given the existing reasons-and-review procedure in the Northern District, it would be a fairly small step to permit defendants
and complainants to "appeal" the decision in their case to higherlevel prosecutors. At present, the referring law enforcement agent
is generally advised, orally or in writing, of the reasons for nonprosecution. This procedure should be formalized, however; the referring agent should always receive a copy of the declination memorandum. The agent, or his superiors, could then be given the right
to appeal the decision to supervising prosecutors, with perhaps a
further level of "discretionary review" by the Department of Justice. Such review would help to ensure that the reasons asserted by
assistant prosecutors have a valid basis in fact, and that there are
no additional factors that ought to change the result. Such appeals
would also promote a healthy dialogue between prosecutors and
agents, in which the agents become more familiar with the
problems and policies of prosecution, while the prosecutors keep in
touch with the needs of law enforcement as seen from the street.
Much of the same reasoning would support giving victims and
defendants a written statement of reasons for prosecution decisions. But such disclosure of prosecution policy raises several additional problems. First, there are sometimes good reasons for not
publicizing such policy-where, for example, selective enforcement
of the most serious violations is used to conserve resources. 13 2 Sec"I It would also be useful if assistant prosecutors were required to cite any pro-prosecution factors in cases that are recommended for declination, and vice versa. Such a complete statement of "aggravating and mitigating" factors would greatly assist supervisors in
reviewing screening decisions.
32 See text at notes 138-140 infra.
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ond, even if publication itself is not a problem, it is likely that any
corresponding right to administrative appeal would be used much
more frequently by victims and defendants than by law enforcement agents, since the latter are more familiar with prosecution
policy. Finally, in the case of decisions in favor of prosecution, any
preindictment appeal raises potential statute of limitations
problems, and postfiling appeals may run into speedy-trial
problems. Even if the defendant waives any right he or she might
have to prompt indictment and trial, there are important public
interests in prompt disposition'3 3 that would be threatened by prolonged appeals. All of this is not to say that victims and defendants should never be given reasons and administrative-appeal
rights, only that it is difficult to make these procedures a firm
requirement.
2. Formal Rules. Should prosecutors be required to go further and develop firm rules to guide the exercise of discretion?
Such rulemaking is perhaps the most frequently suggested mechanism for controlling prosecutorial discretion. The arguments in
favor of this approach have often been discussed in the literature,"3 and may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) rules aid in
the training of new assistant prosecutors'3 5 and in the internal review of all prosecution decisions, so that office policy is consistently and efficiently carried out; (2) rules give greater substance to
administrative- or judicial-appeal rights, since in the absence of
such rules it is difficult for victims or defendants to discover and
prove that they have been treated differently; 136 (3) in some cases,
it may also be appropriate for defendants or complainants to challenge prosecution policy itself (as opposed to failures to follow the
policy) as being inconsistent with legislative intent or constitutional requirements; (4) rules permit the legislature to know exactly how much of the substantive criminal law is being actively
enforced, against which types of offenders, and for what purposes,
and this information permits more intelligent and realistic legislative action; (5) rules serve to reassure the public, complainants and
See Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 667, 668-69 (1976).
See authorities cited notes 116, 119 supra.
This is particularly important in light of the high turnover rate in most prosecutors'
offices. Abrams, supra note 119, at 6.
"36See, e.g., Falk v. United States, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973)' (en banc) (defendant
successfully made out defense of discriminatory enforcement by showing that he was indicted in violation of a Selective Service policy of not prosecuting for failure to carry a draft
card). Unpublished policy is particularly unfair to defendants represented by less experienced counsel who are likely to be unaware of the policy and thus unable to attack or
enforce it. See Abrams, supra note 119, at 28.
133
'3
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defendants that the prosecutor is not above the law; and (6) in the
rare cases in which nonprosecution represents de facto decriminalization (such as fornication and homosexuality offenses), potential
offenders are entitled to know that their conduct will not be criminally punished, so they need not fear blackmail or harassment.
It will be noted that all of the above arguments, except the
first and perhaps the fourth, depend on such rules or guidelines
being made public. Yet there are often good reasons not to publish
them.3 7 Some of these arguments have been discussed elsewhere, 138 and need only be summarized here: (1) publication would
reduce the legitimate deterrent and moralizing effects of the criminal law, at least in cases in which declination of prosecution were
not meant to condone the behavior, but only to conserve resources 139 or respect federal/state jurisdictional principles; (2) if
potential defendants in minor cases knew in advance that they
would not be prosecuted, they would cease to cooperate with law
enforcement agents in the investigation and prosecution of more
serious offenders; 4 0 (3) publication inevitably would result in more
frequent attempts to invoke judicial review of prosecution policy
and decisions, and such review would further clog an already overburdened criminal court system; and (4) if prosecutors knew that
their policy would be published, they would be reluctant to formulate it, or to change it once it was formulated. ' 4 These are serious
problems, and because of them it seems unreasonable to impose an
inflexible requirement that all prosecution policy be reduced to
published rules. But prosecutors should be encouraged to make
public at least the broad outlines of their policy, in order to serve
partially the external goals of rulemaking. More detailed disclosure
of prosecution policies may be made in camera to the appropriate
legislative committee members.
As for the important internal uses of detailed prosecution
137 The extent to which the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), may
require public disclosure of federal prosecutorial policy statements is considered in Beck,
supra note 13, at 345-54. See also Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the Department Charging Manual's rules and guidelines relating to screening and pretrial diversion decisions are not exempt from discovery under the
Freedom of Information Act).
138See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 119, at 25-33.
139 Id. at 29-31. Not only may the publication of selective enforcement policies lessen
the moralizing (or "standard-setting") function of the law, it may also evoke outright disrespect, if such selectivity is perceived as unfair or arbitrary. See text at notes 82-84 supra.
140 See text at notes 114 supra, 210 infra.
141 See Abrams, supra note 119, at 29, 32-33.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:246

rulemaking, the major question is feasibility: can rules be formulated that provide useful guidance and structure, without creating
excessive complexity or inflexibility in the screening process? The
present study suggests that rules are feasible, at least up to a
point. Our data suggest that some offenses and types of offenders
are almost never prosecuted,1 4 2 and this fact could certainly be
stated in writing and used to train new assistants and guide internal-review processes. It is important, however, to recognize that
there are several different types of rules, which differ in their utility as guiding and structuring mechanisms. The strictest form is
the mandatory rule: "all conspiracies to distribute heroin will be
prosecuted, if the evidence suggests a reasonable likelihood of conviction." The next strictest form is what Professor Abrams calls
the presumptive rule: 43 "cases involving one ounce of heroin or
less will normally not be prosecuted, absent unusual circumstances." To the extent that such "unusual circumstances" can be
enumerated, of course, such a presumptive rule begins to resemble
a mandatory one. If a significant number of unspecified exceptions
remain, then the presumptive rule begins to resemble the third
prototype, the guideline or factor: "a prior record for the same offense is a factor in favor of prosecution." Such a factor may be
further developed, to provide for certain contingencies: "factor X
controls factor Y when the two are in conflict," or "factors A and
B, when both present, may provide a sufficient basis for
declination."
The present study reveals examples of each of these prototypes, and there does not appear to be any reason to prevent such
rules from being reduced to written form for internal use. Of
course, there is always the danger of leaks, and the very idea of
"secret law" is repugnant. Nevertheless, the reasons in favor of internal rules, and against routine publication of such rules, seem to
require this result.
Over time, the number of mandatory and presumptive rules
should increase as policy is refined and developed. There will, however, undoubtedly remain a substantial area of discretion, regulated only by a large number of competing factors that, in their
cumulative impact and interaction, produce somewhat unpredictable, case-specific results. This seems to be inherent in the nature

142

infra.
143

Many of these cases become "immediate declinations." See text at notes 189-196
Abrams, supra note 119, at 22-24.
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of criminal justice discretion; to the extent that we seek to achieve
a variety of goals through the criminal process, while recognizing a
large number of moral and social principles, we are forced to make
complex judgments involving a large number of imprecise
1 44

factors.

3. Judicial Review. Perhaps the most radical approach to
regulating prosecutorial discretion is to expand the scope of judicial review. Under current law, the courts will almost never intervene to compel prosecution of a given offender. 145 This reluctance
to reverse the declination decision is usually based on separationof-powers doctrines, but it also reflects the practical difficulties of
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and evaluating the allocation of scarce prosecution resources. In its 1973 report, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals nevertheless recommended that victims and complainants
have recourse to judicial review and that courts order prosecution
where the declination constitutes an "abuse of discretion. 1 146 The
commentary to this recommendation, however, indicates that such
orders would be rare, and an examination of the reasons for declination discovered in the present study suggests that this is an accurate prediction. How often, for example, would the court be able
to go behind the record to determine that there was an insufficient
factual basis for the reasons the prosecutor had provided? Finally,
how can courts review the reasons for declination without risking
undesirable publication of prosecution policies?
Given these problems, it seems unlikely that courts will agree
to review many declination decisions.1 47 The decision to prosecute,
on the other hand, has received somewhat closer scrutiny by the
courts, at least where there are allegations that the defendant was
singled out on the basis of constitutionally impermissible factors
such as race, 4 8 deterrence of the exercise of first amendment
See, e.g., Table 6 supra (listing reasons for declination of prosecution).
See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1973). But cf. NAACP v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976) (upholding a complaint for'
mandamus to force federal prosecutors and the FBI to conduct a "thorough and meaningful" investigation of the alleged civil rights violations committed by state officials), dismissed as moot, 76 F.R.D. 134 (D.D.C. 1977).
146 U.S. NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra
'note 2, Standard 1.2, at 24.
1'"The strongest case for such review seems to exist when the failure to prosecute involves improper motives: corruption or favoritism toward the defendant, or discriminatory
intent directed at the victim(s).
14 E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (defendants were Chinese).
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rights,1 49 or retaliation for the exercise of certain other rights. 5 0
The filing of patently insubstantial charges, to harass the defendant or for other improper reasons, has also been successfully attacked.' 5 ' The Supreme Court has held, however, that accidental
inconsistency is not a denial of equal protection, and it has suggested that even "conscious selectivity" is constitutional if not im52
properly motivated.1
Is there a need for a broader defense of discriminatory enforcement? Specifically, should defendants be allowed to contest
their charges on the basis that other, similarly situated defendants
have not been prosecuted? The present study suggests that, in the
Northern District at least, prosecuted and declined defendants are
generally not similarly situated. With a few exceptions, the former
have committed more serious offenses, and unless we are willing to
expand substantially the scope of federal law enforcement efforts,
this de minimis policy seems unlikely to be overruled by the
courts. Undoubtedly, there are some examples of clear, inconsistent treatment of identical cases.'
As noted previously, this is
sometimes intentional: only a small fraction of minor income tax
violators are criminally prosecuted, because such selective enforcement is thought sufficient to deter most violators (or more precisely, it is thought that the cost of additional prosecution would
outweigh the benefits of additional deterrence).
What, then, of what might be called "unprincipled inconsistency"? Should the courts protect defendants from careless screening, resulting in the filing of weak or trivial charges? Weak cases
1,9 E.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (defendant was active as a
draft counselor and war protester). But cf. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir.
1978) (upholding the policy of singling out vocal tax protesters who openly refuse to file a
return).
150 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that, in order to reduce the
danger of prosecutorial "vindictiveness" against defendants who successfully appeal, prosecutor may not file felony charges in trial de novo of convicted misdemeanant unless such
charges could not previously have been brought). See also People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901,
200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1964) (new trial ordered, based on evidence that defendant's prosecution for housing violations came shortly after she had exposed certain corrupt
practices in the Department of Buildings). But cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978) (refusing to apply the Blackledge "vindictiveness" principle to a prosecutor who filed
habitual-offender charges against a forgery defendant who refused to plead guilty).
'- See Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.) (enjoined further prosecution of state
perjury charges that were brought with no apparent factual basis after the defendant had
already been acquitted of equally unfounded charges of conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
152 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
153 See note 122 supra.
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do not appear to be a serious problem, at least in the Northern
District. Prosecutors are generally motivated to maintain the highest possible conviction rate, based on cases filed, since this statistic
more than any other is taken as the measure of prosecutorial effectiveness. There are also important practical considerations: high
screening and conviction rates tend to encourage defendants to
plead guilty, thereby conserving limited resources. Thus, even
without any judicial review (beyond determination of probable
cause), prosecutors have an incentive to screen out weak cases at
the earliest possible stage. The result in the Northern District is a
very high declination rate and a very low rate of dismissal or acquittal after the filing of formal charges. The conviction rate for
the prosecuted defendants in our sample was 91%, and on a case
basis it was even higher: at least one defendant was convicted in
93% of the cases filed.
Similarly, prosecutors are motivated to avoid wasting scarce
resources on defendants when policy reasons indicate that prosecution is inappropriate or unnecessary. In particular, prosecutors
want to keep their average sentence-severity rates high 1 " to
demonstrate their effectiveness. This tends to minimize filings in
trivial cases.
C.

The Broader Issues of Prosecutorial Discretion

The magnitude of federal prosecutorial discretion and the inherent difficulties in closely regulating the filing decision have major implications for any attempts to reform later, more visible areas of criminal justice discretion. Thus, attempts to give the courts
greater control over which defendants are admitted to pretrial diversion programs 155 are of limited utility if prosecutors retain
broad, uncontrolled charging powers. Given these powers, prosecutors can decline or dismiss all charges if the court refuses to permit
diversion, and they can prevent the court from diverting certain
defendants by charging offenses too serious to allow diversion
under the applicable program standards. 156 Similarly, speedy-trial
151

Cf. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & EcoN. 61, 63 (1971)

(assuming that prosecutors will seek to maximize the number of convictions, weighted by
their sentence lengths).
165 E.g., S. 1819, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (proposed Federal Criminal Diversion Act
of 1977). The proposal required the approval of a judge or magistrate prior to entry into any
diversion "program," as defined in section 3(2) of the bill.
156 See People v. Campbell, 46 Cal. App. 3d 799, 120 Cal. Rptr. 330, 334 (1975) (refus-
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reforms' 57 must take into account the ability of the prosecutor to
manipulate the events, such as arrest, that trigger statutory time
limits; prosecution delay of these events can produce "compliance"
with the time limits without actually reducing real delays.' 5 8
Attempts to abolish or regulate strictly plea bargaining practices' 59 also presuppose that we can effectively control the earlier,
less visible decision to file charges. Without such control, prosecutors can avoid plea bargaining restrictioris in a number of ways:
defendants thought likely to demand trial can be charged with
more serious or more numerous offenses; prosecutors can substitute "pretrial diversion bargaining," at least in cases suitable for
probation sentences; and "uncooperative" defendants (and their
attorneys) who insist on trials can receive less favorable treatment
in subsequent cases, or on other pending charges. In this study we
have focused primarily on the decision whether to file any charges,
but the decision concerning selection of charges-which is crucial
to the plea bargaining process-is at least as complex and difficult
to regulate. If the filing and charging decisions cannot be regulated
more closely than they are at present, the imposition of strict, external limitations on the visible forms of plea bargaining may not
substantially improve matters, but it is certain to make the remaining discretion less visible.
Recently proposed mandatory or "determinate" sentencing reforms' ° may also have limited utility given the extensive nature of
prosecutorial discretion in the system. If a precise sentence or one
within a narrowed range must be imposed on and served by those
convicted, the discretion that was previously shared by prosecutors, judges, and parole boards will simply be exercised exclusively
by the prosecutor.' 6 ' Perhaps the most extensive scenario would be
a combination of plea bargaining "abolition" and determinate sentencing. In that case, judges would not even share power through
ing to review the prosecutor's threat to charge a nondivertible offense if the defendant
moved for diversion).
E.g., Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976).
118 See Frase, supra note 133, at 678-79, 684-86.
189 See note 2 supra.
160 See note 3 supra. Such reforms have now been enacted in several states. See, e.g.,
California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1168-1170.6
(West Supp. 1979).
1" See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978); F.
Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform
8-13 (1977) (Occasional Papers, The University of Chicago Law School).
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the plea bargaining process; except for the power of judges and juries to acquit, prosecutors would control the entire outcome
through exercise of their filing and charging discretion. Whether
this would be better or worse than the existing system depends on
one's view of the respective competence of prosecutors, judges, and
parole boards in a given jurisdiction; "three discretions may be

better than one. "162

All of this does not mean, of course, that reforms of pretrial
diversion, speedy trial, plea bargaining, and sentencing should be
abandoned. But such reforms must respect the immense residual
powers of the prosecutor, and avoid drastic changes that would
simply drive discretion underground. Reforms that attempt to regulate, but not abolish, discretion stand a better chance of producing real long-term change, at least if they are supported by the key
figure in criminal justice administration, the prosecutor. Professor
Zimring has called the prosecutor "the black hole of criminal justice." Our data suggest that, in the federal system at least, this is
an apt metaphor; the huge discretion of the U.S. Attorney can distort or swallow up all but the most massive reform efforts.
CONCLUSION

This study reveals that the prosecutorial discretion of the U.S.
Attorney is vast and unchecked by any formal, external constraints
or regulatory mechanisms. Yet the prospects for effective and efficient external controls over prosecutorial decisions seem slight; the
judgments involved are complex and unsuited to judicial review,
and even the formulation and publication of guidelines poses substantial difficulties.
Such broad discretion raises important, unresolved policy
questions as to what behavior should be criminally prosecuted, by
what jurisdictional authority. The data also suggest that recent attempts to formalize or restrict discretion in the areas of pretrial
diversion, speedy trial, plea bargaining, and sentencing may only
serve to shift the locus of discretion back to the prosecutor's filing
and charging decisions, which may be even harder to control.
Yet, at the same time, the study suggests that there are effective mechanisms short of judicial review or public rulemaking that
can regularize and improve prosecutorial discretion. The office we
studied uses an internal regulatory procedure whereby the reasons
162

F. Zimring, supra note 161, at 12.
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for each declination of prosecution are reduced to writing and reviewed by supervising prosecutors. This procedure appeared workable and effective in producing clear patterns of office prosecution
policy, and it should be adopted as standard office procedure by all
prosecutors. Such a "reasons-and-review" system serves to centralize responsibility for prosecution policy, and it forms the basis for
the gradual development of more precise rules and guidelines. This
approach does not, of course, guarantee good results under all circumstances. At our present level of regulatory technology, much
depends on the ability and good intentions of the prosecutor, and
any mechanical faith in a particular process seems misplaced. Nevertheless, if more prosecutors' offices implement such internal procedures, and studies such as this one are replicated in other federal
and state jurisdictions, we may begin to develop a clearer understanding of how to formulate and enforce sound prosecution policy.
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APPENDIX

A:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REASONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL
DECLINATION

Previous studies of prosecutorial discretion have suggested
that the reasons for nonprosecution fall into roughly two classes:
those that relate to the ability to obtain a conviction given the
state of the evidence and the criminal law, and those that relate to
the desirability of prosecution and conviction in a particular case
or type of case. 16 3 This general distinction was adopted for purposes of the present study, but the second category was subdivided
into two categories. The first includes those prosecutions that were

declined because other measures were being taken to punish, treat,
or otherwise deal with the offender. Such prosecution alternatives
include pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution, restitution, prosecution by state or other federal authorities, civil or administrative
remedies, parole or probation revocation, and civil commitment. In
addition, the dropping of charges because of a plea bargain, or simply because other pending charges are considered sufficient, also
represents an alternative to prosecution of the present matter.
The second subdivision contains the purest form of
prosecutorial discretion-declinations based on policy. If the evidence would support a conviction, and no alternative to prosecution is being pursued, it is clear that the prosecutor is making a
policy decision concerning the desirability of doing something
about conduct that constitutes at least a technical violation of the
law. Such policy considerations may relate to the character of the
suspect, such as age or prior record, or the nature and seriousness
of the particular offense. Other policy reasons that weigh against
prosecution include the recommendation of other officials, the defendant's status as an informer or witness, excessive delays in prosecution,"" and the existence of law enforcement or government
163See, e.g., F. MILLER, supra note 8, at 3-7. A major source of guidance in the develop-

ment of the categories was P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGGIO, M. STRUMWASSER & P.
DE LEON, supra note 10, Table 42. Many specific reasons were drawn from previous studies
of federal prosecutorial discretion. See Kaplan, supra note 13; Rabin, supra note 8;
Schwartz, supra note 13. See also A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

92-98,

Standard 3.9 & Commentary (Approved Draft 1971); CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N,
UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS (1974); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standards 8.2, 9.3, 11.3 (1977); U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 2, Standard 1.1.

1" Some declinations based on excessive delay involved arrested defendants; these were
included in the "convictability" category because defendants would be entitled to move for
dismissal for violation of the sixth amendment speedy-trial guarantee, see Strunk v. United
States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973). Other declinations based on this reason, however, involved sus-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:246

misconduct that would be brought to light by prosecution and
trial.
The cornvictability category can also be subdivided into several
major groups of reasons. First, prosecution might be declined because of the complete absence of a necessary act or mental state
required for criminal liability-so that no crime was committed.
Second, even if the suspect's behavior appears to have been criminal, there may be insufficient evidence of the criminal act or the
criminal intent to establish his guilt in court. A frequent cause of
such insufficiency is the absence or unavailability of the parties-the suspect, victim, or a key witness. These reasons were included within a third group entitled "parties unavailable." An attempt was also made to distinguish between physical
unavailability, reluctance to testify, and credibility problems. A
fourth group of convictability reasons was created for those situations in which the applicable statute of limitations, an immunity
grant, or some form of illegal procedure, presents a legal bar to
successful prosecution.
The categories of reasons can be viewed as constituting a logical hierarchy, in which the presence of a "higher order" reason
should constitute a sufficient basis for a declination of prosecution.
Thus, if there is insufficient evidence to convict a defendant, there
should be no need to consider alternatives to prosecution or additional policy reasons for not prosecuting; indeed, it may be improper to steer innocent or unconvictable defendants into prosecution alternatives such as pretrial diversion. Declination for lack of
a prosecutable case is perhaps the least controversial basis for declining to prosecute, and such reasons are in some sense "stronger"
than either prosecution alternatives or policy reasons. Conversely,
if prosecution alternatives or policy reasons are cited, either alone
or in combination with each other, this should imply that the case
was otherwise prosecutable. Finally, there is a sense in which a
prosecution alternative is a "stronger" reason than a policy reason
for nonprosecution. If something else is being done to punish or
deal with the defendant or his crime, then the defendant is not
getting off free and clear.
The three categories of reasons, however, are not always mutupects not yet arrested, who were thus not covered by the sixth amendment, United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). These cases did not appear to involve lost witnesses or other
specific evidentiary problems that could have been caused by delay in prosecution. Apparently, the U.S. Attorney simply felt that it was inappropriate to press stale charges. Accordingly, such cases were classified as "policy" declinations. See Table 6 supra.
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ally exclusive. For example, a case that is marginally prosecutable,
despite evidentiary problems, might be declined because of the
availability of a strong prosecution alternative such as parole revocation, and in such a case both convictability and alternative reasons might be cited.16 5 Similarly, many of the policy reasons that
weigh against invoking formal criminal penalties also support the
use of alternatives such as pretrial diversion; the appearance of
policy reasons in conjunction with prosecution alternatives might
simply represent reasons for use of the alternative. Finally, one
might predict that in a close case there would be a tendency to
invoke as many reasons as possible. As shown in the article, 66 the
use of multiple reasons is quite common, and presents certain
practical difficulties in analysis and presentation of the research
results. For example, it is possible to state the number and percentage of declinations in which a given reason or category was
present, but the total cases and percentages arrived at by this
means will always exceed the total sample, due to the multiple67
reason cases.2
The observed variation in number of reasons per declination
raises an important methodological issue: How reliable are the reasons asserted in these file memoranda? Can we take the word of
the Assistant U.S. Attorney that a given case did or did not involve
an evidence problem, or the existence of a prosecution alternative?
To a large extent, these questions are unanswerable, but the following observations can be made. First, it is clear that these file
memoranda were written entirely for the purposes of internal office
administration; neither the assistants involved nor their supervisors had any reason to expect that their work would ever be "audited" by outsiders. Second, since no lawyer wants to be "reversed
on appeal," there is reason to believe that the assistants would cite
as many reasons as possible to justify their recommendation of
declination. 68 On the other hand, the assistants and supervisors
involved did not have a checklist of reasons and reason categories
"' Such

combinations turned out to be quite rare in our sample. See text at note 48

supra.
"6 See text at notes 41-42 supra.
167 See Table 6 supra; text at note 42 supra.
168 The immediate declinations present a slightly different situation, since a tentative
decision to decline had already been made before assignment to the assistant. We discovered, however, that immediate declinations actually involved a larger number of reasons per
case than did later or magistrate declinations, so it appears that the assistants took their job
seriously, and presented a thoroughly documented justification for nonprosecution. See Table 23 infra.
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before them, and the failure to cite a particular reason does not
necessarily mean that it could not have been cited, only that it was
not considered necessary in order to justify the declination decision. In light of the first two observations, however, it seems likely
that the omitted reasons were less important than those cited.
Given the hierarchy of reasons hypothesized above, 16 9 we would expect "convictability"-reasons to be cited whenever applicable and
policy reasons to be underreported.
It is conceivable that assistants might cite reasons that were
not actually justified in the particular case, and that the supervising attorney could not check even if he reviewed the entire contents of the attached file jacket. But, since the facts of the case are
presumably well known to the referring agent, any serious distortions could result in complaints to supervising attorneys and exposure of the "cover-up." Thus, we believe that the declination reasons we have observed are a reliable indication of the major
considerations that led to nonprosecution of these matters.
Not all declinations in our sample had documented reasons,
however. Sometimes we were unable to find the U.S. Attorney's
file, and in other cases the file did not contain a declination memorandum. Although it was often possible to guess the reasons for
declination, based on other materials in the file, coding of such apparent reasons was likely to be highly subjective and it was also
impossible to be sure that all relevant facts were shown in the file.
Hence, these cases have been treated as missing data.
Approximately 16% of the declined matters in our sample had
unknown reasons for declination. These cases were examined carefully to determine whether they fell disproportionately within any
offense category, crime pattern, or defendant type. A few offenses
were found to be particularly likely to have missing data. The outstanding example was civil rights cases, typically involving charges
of police brutality in connection with an arrest of the complainant
by local police; fully 100% of the civil rights matters in our sample
(twenty-eight cases involving forty-eight defendants) had missing
files.170 Matters involving tax fraud and mail fraud were also likely
to have unknown reasons. All together these three offenses accounted for 48% of the defendants with missing data.
169 See text at notes 163-165 supra.
170 During the period covered by this study, all civil rights matters were handled by a
supervising attorney, presumably because they involved highly sensitive relationships be-

tween state and federal government. The declination decisions in these cases were apparently not subject to formal review by higher-level attorneys within the office.
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Other than these offenses, there were no discernible differences between the cases with reasons and those without. Thus, in
the analysis in the article, it was assumed that the cases with
known reasons adequately represent the total sample, except for
the three types of offenses mentioned above.
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ADJUSTED PROSECUTION RATES

As noted in the article,' 7 ' we cannot necessarily assume that
different offenses present the same proportion of prosecutable
cases. Consequently, "gross" prosecution rates do not necessarily
reflect differences in prosecution policy. Analysis of reasons for
declination of these different types of offense can reveal whether in
fact cases with a low prosecution rate tend to involve an unusually
large proportion of convictability problems or the existence of attractive prosecution alternatives.
Table 14 presents this analysis for sixteen of the twenty-two
offense categories analyzed in the article.' 7 2 The left-hand column
in Table 14 reproduces the gross prosecution rates reported in
Table 3, and the middle three columns break down the reasons
for declination of cases within each offense category. 73 Thus, for
example, 25% of the declinations for mail theft involved at least
one convictability problem; 68% involved an alternative to prosecution; and 8% involved only policy reasons.
These frequencies demonstrate that the reasons asserted for
declination vary significantly by offense. As suggested in the article, 7 4 some offenses with very low prosecution rates involve a high

proportion of convictability problems-for example, thefts of government property, thefts from interstate shipments, embezzlement,
counterfeiting, and extortion. Dyer Act cases without a conspiracy
charge seem to be prosecuted infrequently because of the widespread use of a prosecution alternative. Several other offenses with
low prosecution rates, however, do not show such a pattern-for
example, importing marijuana or other drugs, and simple assaults.
Moreover, several offenses with relatively high prosecution rates
also reveal a large proportion of convictability problems or prosecution alternatives. Thus, it does not appear that convictability
problems or the availability of alternatives to prosecution account
for the differential prosecution rates shown in Table 3.
The right-hand column in Table 14 shows what happens if we
adjust prosecution rates by excluding all declinations involving
17

See text at notes 38-39 supra.

The six offenses omitted in Table 14 either involved no declined cases (for example,
stolen car, conspiracy offenses) or an insufficient number of declined cases with known reasons for declination (for example, civil rights violations).
173 In multi-defendant cases, the reasons given for declining the "lead" defendant were
172

used. There were relatively few cases with different reasons for individual defendants.
174 See text at notes 38-39 supra.
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TABLE 14
PROSECUTION RATES AND CATEGORIES OF REASONS FOR DECLINATION
CATEGORIES OF REASONS
FOR DECLINATION C
(PERCENTAGE)

02

W

0 r
0 3

.'

ADJUSTED PROSECUTION
RATE EXCLUDING WEAK
CASES (PERCENTAGE) d

GROSS PROSECUTION
RATE (PERCENTAGE) b

a
"
UO

Violent offenses

50

50

13

38

64

Mail theft
Theft of U.S. property
Theft from interstate
shipment
Stolen autos (no
conspiracy)

51
4

25
68

68
11

8
22

57
11

8

55

35

10

17

5

16

63

23

6

Importing marijuana
Sale of other drugs

2
53

15
38

17
53

69
8

2
65

False statements
Other fraud
Embezzlement

21
7
11

36
50
80

33
41
20

32
9
0

29
13
38

Interstate forgery
Other forgery
Counterfeiting

12
16
13

46
29
61

43
52
7

12
18
32

20
21
27

Weapons and explosives
Extortion, racketeering,
and threats
Simple assault

24

44

41

16

35

10
0

72
46

23
40

5
15

29
0

17

43

36

21

26

OFFENSE CATEGORY a

All offenses

a

ft

a Offenses are those shown in Table 3 supra, except where category frequencies
cannot be computed, owing to missing data. See text at note 172 supra.
b Based on total number of matters received for each offense.
c Percentages are based on number of declined matters in each offense category
that had known reasons. "Convictability" includes all combinations of convictability reasons with other factors. "Prosecution Alternatives" includes combinations of prosecution alternatives with policy reasons. Because of rounding,
some rows do not total 100%.
d Excludes matters declined for convictability reasons. See text at note 175 infra.

convictability problems.17 5 With two exceptions, all offenses that
had a lower-than-average gross prosecution rate have a lower-than75Specifically, we calculated the adjusted prosecution rate for each offense by dividing
the number of matters prosecuted by the estimated total number of matters received that

had a sufficient basis for prosecution. The latter figure equals the sum of (1) matters prose-
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average adjusted prosecution rate, and vice versa. The adjusted
prosecution rates for embezzlement and extortion cases are now
somewhat higher than the average, which indicates that there is
apparently no particular policy against prosecution of such offenses. The overall adjusted prosecution rate of 26% is somewhat
higher than the gross rate of 17%; nevertheless, prosecution
alternatives or policy considerations lead to declination of three
out of four "convictable" cases.
In addition to the crime charge, it was demonstrated in the
article17 that the probability of prosecution is directly related to
certain details of the offense involved. We can now reexamine
these implicit prosecution criteria to see how they are related to
known reasons for declination. 17 7 As shown in Table 15, the failure
to prosecute marijuana cases involving less than one pound of contraband is not due to either convictability problems or attractive
alternatives to prosecution. Such reasons do, however, account for
all of the declinations of marijuana cases involving more than one
pound of contraband, and most of the declinations of cocaine and
heroin offenses. 17 8 Cases involving loss of over $500 are also more
likely to involve convictability problems, and are rarely declined
for policy reasons alone. 7 9 The number of defendants involved also
affects the probability of prosecution. 80 Matters with more than
cuted, plus (2) matters declined for reasons other than "convictability." Matters with unknown reasons for declination posed a problem, since their inclusion in the denominator
would assume, in effect, that they were all prosecutable; to avoid this bias, we estimated the
reasons for declination of these matters on the basis of the declinations with known reasons,
in each offense category.
178

See text at notes 35-40 supra.

Some of the prosecution criteria previously discussed, such as the amount of cocaine
or heroin and the presence or absence of conspiracy charges, cannot be verified by the
means described in the text due to an insufficient number of sample matters with known
offense details and reasons for declinations.
17I When declinations involving convictability reasons are excluded, the previously
noted differences in prosecution rates for these three drug types become even greater:
Gross prosecution
Adjusted prosecution
1I

rate (from Table 4)

rate

5%

6%

cocaine

35%

42%

heroin

52%

71%

marijuana

179 The exclusion of declinations involving convictability reasons lowers the median dollar value of loss in declined matters from $325 to $229; the median dollar value in prosecuted cases was $1,700, see Table 5 supra.
180 See note 40 supra.
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three defendants are much more likely to be declined because of
an attractive alternative, and policy reasons alone were never a basis for declination. Thus, these three variables-amount and type
of drug, amount of loss, and number of defendants-appear to reflect fairly consistent prosecution policies, and the patterns observed previously are not due to coincidental variations in the
strength of the evidence or the availability of prosecution alternatives. Moreover, there is a consistent tendency to cite the "strongest" reasons when justifying declination of the offenses with high
prosecution rates. Thus, when a strong positive prosecution criterion (such as loss over $500) is present, policy reasons alone are
generally not deemed sufficient to justify declination.
TABLE 15
CATEGORIES OF REASONS FOR DECLINATION OF MATTERS
BY VARIOUS OFFENSE DETAILS

Convictability
(Percentage)

Prosecution
Alternatives
(Percentage)

Policy Reasons
Only
(Percentage)

Marijuana
1 lb. or less
over 1 lb.

8
25

8
75

83
0

Marijuana
all amounts (or
unknown amount)

14

19

67

Cocaine
all amounts

20

50

30

56

33

11

36
66

42
32

22
2

43
36

36
64

21
0

43

36

21

Offense Details

Heroin
all amounts

Loss
less than $500
$500 or more

Number of defendants
1-3
4-7
All matters

NOTE: Percentages are bised on number of declined matters in each offense subcategory with known reasons for declination. "Convictability" includes all combinations of convictability reasons with other factors. "Prosecution Alternatives"
includes combinations of prosecution alternatives with policy reasons. Because of
rounding, not all rows total 100%.
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TABLE 16
CATEGORIES OF REASONS FOR DECLINATION BY PRIOR RECORD OF DEFENDANT

Prior Record

Convictability
(Percentage)

Prosecution

Policy Reasons

Alternatives
(Percentage)

Only
(Percentage)

No convictions

33

38

29

State and/or federal
convictions

30

49

21

Unknown

53

33

14

No known convictions a

47

35

18

45

37

18

All defendants

NOTE: See Table 15 NOTE supra.
a Combines "no convictions" and "unknown."

As noted in the article, l"1 our data on declined prosecutions
frequently included the subject's prior record of arrests and convictions. We do not have similar data on prosecuted defendants,
but an examination of the reasons for declination of suspects with
known prior records may suggest whether or not this factor is a
strong positive prosecution criterion. If it is, then the patterns discussed above would lead us to expect that the prosecution of defendants with a known record would tend to be declined for reasons related to convictability. As shown in Table 16, however, the
defendants with a known conviction record are actually less likely
to be declined for these reasons than either defendants with no
such record, or defendants with an unknown record,182 and 21% of
the previously convicted defendants were declined for policy reasons alone. Thus, if a known prior record weighs in favor of federal
prosecution, this factor apparently can be overridden by policy
181 See note 31 supra.
182 For 62% of suspects whose prosecutions were declined for known reasons, there

were no indications of a prior record or absence of a prior record. It is possible that this
large unknown group includes suspects with known prior convictions, but it seems unlikely
that a fact as important as the defendant's prior conviction would have been known to the
Assistant U.S. Attorney and not noted somewhere in the file or court records. Thus, the
"unknown prior record" suspects probably had no known convictions. The much higher incidence of convictability problems among these suspects may explain why the Assistant U.S.
Attorneys did not feel it necessary to investigate the suspect's prior record, or to mention
the absence of a prior record, if this was known.
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considerations. In other words, prior record apparently is not a
strong positive factor weighing in favor of prosecution.18 e

183 Prior record may, however, be a factor favoring prosecution to a moderate degree.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT

CoURTs-1974, at 27 (1977). This data only covers convicted defendants (who may or may
not be representative of all prosecuted defendants in this regard). About 63% of such convicted defendants had known criminal history information.
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ANALYSIS OF DECLINATIONS BY SCREENING STAGES

The analysis in the article examined reasons for declination
and characteristics of declined matters as a whole, in order to determine the principles used by the U.S. Attorney in screening cases
for prosecution.184 Even if these principles are appropriate and
consistently applied, however, it is also important that they be applied efficiently. The U.S. Attorney's office for the Northern District uses a multi-stage screening process, and an examination of
the case characteristics and reasons for declination at each of these
stages will show more precisely how this office goes about the task
of weeding out cases.
In particular, we will examine two aspects of the pretrial
screening process in the Northern District. First, there is the initial
screening decision, made by the Chief of the Criminal Division on
the same day the matter is received, as to whether to enter an "immediate declination.' 8 5 If the screening process is operating efficiently, then such immediate declinations should include those
matters as to which fairly clear-cut policies against prosecution
have been developed. Declinations entered after more extensive examination, on the other hand, should represent either cases of
"borderline" prosecution merit, cases for which declination reasons
subsequently develop, or cases presenting other "unforeseeable"
factors that prevented immediate disposal of the case.
A second level of decision making involves the question
whether or not to take the defendant into custody pending the decision about prosecution. Unlike state prosecutors, who normally
do not learn about a criminal investigation until after the police
have made one or more arrests, federal prosecutors usually have
some control over whether, and when, an arrest takes -place. It is
thus possible to minimize, if not eliminate, "unnecessary" arrests-that is, arrests that do not lead to eventual prosecution. The
prosecutor's screening criteria can be applied to the arrest decision,
thus preventing the arrest of clearly "unprosecutable" defendants. 186 We will therefore examine the frequency and characteristics of all sample declinations following actual or attempted arSee Parts III-V supra.
185 See text at note 28 supra.
186 Occasionally, however, arrest may be justified even when prosecution is unlikely-for example, to terminate a fist fight or other violent behavior. See text at note 209
infra. See also note 37 supra.
184

1980]

Federal ProsecutorialDiscretion

rest-referred to here as "magistrate declinations"1 5 -7to see
whether the arrest was justified at the time by apparent prosecution merit or other factors. In an "efficient" system, we would expect to find that the proportion of declinations made after arrest is
relatively low, and that there is some good reason why these unprosecuted defendants were arrested.
The following analysis of the initial screening and arrest decisions will contrast "immediate" with "magistrate" declinations.
Both will also be compared to a third group of declinations, those
involving cases that survive the initial screening but that are subsequently declined without any attempt to obtain the arrest of any
defendant. This large group will be referred to as "intermediate
declinations."
A.

The Initial Screening Stage: Immediate Declinations

As noted in the article," ss slightly more than half of all cases
referred to the Criminal Division become "immediate declinations," while the remainder of the cases receive more extensive
evaluation by the office. The only definite office "rule," at this
stage, is that a matter will not be declined immediately if any defendant has already been arrested by federal agents. 189 The data,
however, suggest that many immediate declinations are, in practice, "routine." For one thing, the sheer volume of immediate declinations-constituting 70% of all declinations-suggests the application of well-established prosecution policies.1 90 Of course, it
might also reflect overly hasty "disposal" of cases, so further analysis of the immediate declinations is needed to see if these matters
display characteristics that make speedy disposition desirable.
Table 17 shows the stages of screening at which various offenses are declined. There is a strong tendency for offenses with
the lowest prosecution rates to be declined immediately-for example, theft of government property, auto theft with no conspiracy, marijuana offenses, and civil rights cases. Conversely, several

167 Although our primary concern is with actual arrests that did not lead to prosecution,
we will examine all magistrate filings, since these represent "attempted" arrests prior to
formal charging, and the fact of actual arrest subsequent to the filing is largely a matter of
luck in finding the defendant. Six of the 70 sample defendants whose cases were declined
after the filing of a complaint with the U.S. magistrate were never arrested or otherwise
apprehended.
188 See text at note 28 supra.
:89 Many such matters, however, are subsequently declined. See text at note 196 infra.
0 The large number of these declinations may also suggest that pre-referral screening
by federal law enforcement agencies is limited. See note 11 supra.
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offenses with very high prosecution rates are rarely declined at this
early stage: mail theft, heroin offenses, and tax fraud. Drug offenses display a clear inverse correlation between prosecution rates
and proportion of immediate declinations. Thus, it appears that
the first stage of screening operates efficiently to separate out offenses that are rarely prosecuted from those with a higher
probability of prosecution.
TABLE 17
CASES DECLINED AT EACH STAGE: OFFENSE

STAGE OF DECLINATION

GROSS PROSECU-

(PERCENTAGE) a

TION RATE

Immediate

Intermediate

Magistrate

(PERCENTAGE) b

Violent offenses

71

0

29

50

Mail theft
Theft of U.S. property
Theft from interstate
shipment
Stolen autos (no
conspiracy)

19
88

39
12

42
0

51
4

70

26

4

8

93

7

0

5

Marijuana
Cocaine*
Heroin*

98
57
18

2
17
10

0
26
72

5
37
52

Mail fraud
Tax fraud*
False statements
Other fraud
Embezzlement

62
0
60
57
65

38
100
40
42
35

0
0
0
1
0

21
59
21
7
11

Interstate forgery
Other forgery
Counterfeiting

67
76
48

20
13
28

13
11
24

12
16
13

Weapons and explosives
Extortion, racketeering,
and threats
Civil rights
Simple assault

53

41

6

24

69
98
60

31
2
20

0
0
20

10
0
0

70

23

7

17

OFFENSE CATEGORY

All offenses
*Fewer than 10 cases

a Based on total number of declined matters in each offense category.
b Based on total matters received in each offense category. See Tables 2 & 3 supra.
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Table 18 compares the dollar amounts of loss, by offense,
among the three stages of declination, and Table 19 summarizes
other differences between these groups. Given the overall prosecution policies discussed in the body of this article, we would expect
that an efficient initial screening process would tend to weed out
the most trivial cases, in terms of dollar amounts of loss, and that
immediate, in contrast to later, declinations would probably contain matters with fewer defendants per case, more unknown parties, and fewer defendants with serious criminal records. To some
extent, the case attributes shown in Tables 18 and 19 conform to
this graduated model, although there are several exceptions. Embezzlement," 1 other forgery, and counterfeiting cases do not show
lower dollar amounts in the initial declination stage, and the first
two declination groups do not differ in number of defendants per
case.
TABLE 18
CASES DECLINED AT EACH STAGE: AMOUNT OF Loss

STAGE OF DECLINATION

Immediate
OFFENSE
Mail theft

Median
Amount ($)

Intermediate

Sample
Size

Sample
Size

186

4

16

2,125

9

12,165

*

*

Theft from interstate shipment

200

Fraud

180

Embezzlement

Median
Amount ($)

Magistrate
Median
Amount ($)

Sample
Size

200

7

10

*

*

18

*

*

*

*

1,090

10

850

6

Interstate forgery

575

9

985

6

1,180

3

Other forgery

289

14

315

5

240

4

Counterfeiting

50

3

*

*

40

5

All offenses

266

83

61

215

21

1,600

*Fewer than 3 cases with known dollar amounts

191 The higher amounts involved in the embezzlement cases that were declined immediately appear to be associated with a very high incidence of convictability problems. This is
not true, however, of the counterfeiting and "other forgery" cases.
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TABLE 19
CASES DECLINED AT EACH STAGE: OTHER DETAmS
STAGE OF DECLINATION

DETAIL OF OFFENSE

Immediate

Intermediate

Magistrate

Average number of defendants
per case

1.34 (288)

1.29 (157)

1.57 (46)

Proportion of unknown subjects

18% (385)

7% (224)

0% (70)

Proportion of defendants with
prior convictions (of total
with known criminal history) a

18% (113)

(63)

49% (49)

13% (224)

34% (70)

Proportion of defendants with
prior convictions (all
defendants) b

5% (385)

48%

NOTE: Figures in parentheses are the number of cases or defendants upon which
each percentage or average is based.
a The exclusion of defendants whose prior conviction record was not mentioned
in the case file results, in effect, in the assumption that these defendants had
conviction records that were similar to the defendants whose records were mentioned.

b The inclusion of all sample defendants in the calculation of the percentage
assumes that the defendants whose prior record was not mentioned had no prior
convictions, or at least none that was known to the prosecutors handling the case.

We turn, then, to the reasons for declination asserted at each
stage of screening, to see what they can tell us about the nature
and validity of the initial screening decision. As shown in Table 20,
triviality of the offense is a factor in about half of the immediate
declinations, whereas this reason figures in only 25 to 30% of subsequently declined defendants. State prosecution is also more frequently cited at the first screening stage, whereas subsequent declinations are more likely to involve a legal bar or other alternatives.
Most of the differences in Table 20 are consistent with the use
of a procedure that eliminates obviously unprosecutable cases on
first inspection, and subjects other cases to further examination.
Thus, if a case involves an amount of loss or contraband that is
lower than the amount generally required for prosecution, this can
be-and apparently is-readily determined at the outset. Similarly, if full investigation has uncovered no known suspect and the
offense does not have a high prosecution priority, there may be no
need for extended evaluation of the matter.
On the other hand, some of the more subtle defects that lead
to the use of the insufficient-evidence reason are less likely to be

Federal ProsecutorialDiscretion
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TABLE 20
CASES DECLINED AT EACH STAGE: REASON GRoups

STAGE OF DECLINATION
(PERCENTAGE)

CATEGORY

REASON GROUP

Immediate

Intermediate

No crime

14

11

0

Insufficient evidence

20

30

20

Parties unavailable

15

8

13

1

6

25

31

14

18

Civil/administrative
remedies

7

14

7

Other

7

25

15

Minor offense

51

25

29

Defendant characteristics

22

16

22

2

7

4

Average number of reasons per defendant

1.7

1.6

1.5

Number of defendants

317

174

55

Convictability

Legal bar
Prosecution
Alternatives

Policy Reasons

State prosecution

Other

Magistrate

apparent upon initial inspection, and this is also reflected in Table
20. Similarly, alternatives to prosecution, such as deferred prosecution, restitution, and parole revocation, are more likely to become
available after further investigation. Magistrate declinations are
especially likely to involve search problems and unconstitutional
delays in prosecution-that is, legal bars. Although some search
problems caused by state and local arrests are reflected in intermediate declinations, most relevant searches are incident to federal
arrest. The reas6n for the greater incidence of delay problems
among magistrate declinations is that constitutional speedy-trial
192
issues arise only after the defendant has been arrested.
Certain reasons for declination appear equally likely to be
cited at earlier and later screening stages. In the case of defendant
192

See note 164 supra.
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characteristics, such factors as the age or prior record of the defendant are evident at the outset or after minimal police investigation. 193 But other mitigating circumstances, such as the defendant's services as a witness or informer, are more likely to become
relevant at a later stage. Similarly, some kinds of civil or administrative remedies are already being pursued at the time of referral
to the 'U.S. Attorney, while others develop or are chosen later.
Substantial reliance on state prosecution in immediate declinations raises a question: how can the U.S. Attorney know, at the
time of initial screening, that state prosecution will be undertaken?
It was noted earlier 19 4 that about 50% of all federal cases in which
prosecution is declined because of probable state action do not involve completed or even pending state prosecution; when immediate declinations are analyzed separately, a similar pattern emerges.
Thus, the timing of declinations based on state prosecution suggests that many such cases involve pure policy considerations
rather than the choice of an effective alternative-that is, such
cases ought to be prosecuted by state rather than federal
authorities.
Table 21 shows the combinations of convictability, prosecution-alternative, and policy reasons at each stage of declination,
and Table 22 shows the overall frequencies for these three categories. Policy reasons, whether alone or in combination, are most*
common among immediate declinations; the relative sufficiency of
policy reasons among immediate declinations (21% were "policy
only") further suggests that these dispositions are based on wellestablished prosecution criteria that are considered to be strong
reasons for declination.
To summarize, the volume, characteristics, and reasoning of
immediate declinations suggest that they are based on prosecution
policies that are capable of application without further investigation or extended examination of specific offense and offender characteristics. Immediate declinations rest on the most basic prosecution policies, ones that are observed in the analysis of declinations
193 Nineteen percent of immediate declinations were based on the suspect's lack of a
prior record, whereas only 8% of the intermediate and magistrate declinations were based
on this factor. The age of the suspect is about equally likely to be cited in each group (6%
of immediate declinations versus 4% of subsequent declinations). The use of the age reason
in intermediate declinations suggests that this factor is only relevant in close cases that
would be prosecuted but for other problems. Age was never the sole basis for declination at
any stage.
194 See Table 13 supra.
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TABLE 21
CASES DECLINED AT EACH STAGE:
CATEGORIES OF REASONS ALONE AND IN COMBINATION

STAGE OF DECLINATION
(PERCENTAGE)

Immediate

Intermediate

Magistrate

Convictability Only

18

25

20

Prosecution Alternative Only

20

23

24

Policy Reason Only

21

12

15

3

12

0

Convictability + Policy Reason

19

13

25

Prosecution Alternative +
Policy Reason

16

13

16

3

2

0

100

100

100

Convictability + Prosecution Alternative

All Three
Total

TABLE 22
CASES DECLINED AT EACH STAGE: CATEGORY OF REASONS

STAGE OF DECLINATION
(PERCENTAGE)

Convictability Reasons

Immediate

Intermediate

Magistrate

43

52

45

Prosecution Alternatives
Policy Reasons
Number of reasons per
defendant

0 1.41

as a whole; these policies-particularly the de minimis rationale-appear to be so "axiomatic" that they permit immediate
declination. This finding has broader policy implications: if fairly
routine, easily applied "rules" already exist, then it may be quite
feasible to reduce them to written form.' 95 At the same time, the
11"See text at notes 123-126 supra.
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fact that immediate declinations tend to dispose of the clearest
cases suggests that the screening process is operating efficiently,
weeding out suspects as soon as it is apparent that the cases
against them lack merit.
B. The Decision to Arrest Pending Final Screening:
"Magistrate" Declinations
The vast majority of declinations by federal prosecutors occur
before the arrest of any of the suspects, as was previously noted. 196
Even among defendants who are actually prosecuted, the arrest is
most often delayed until after the filing of formal charges. 197 This
sparing use of the arrest power probably reflects the nature of federal crime and offenders. Many offenders are middle-class persons
with substantial roots in their communities, who are unlikely to
flee before they can be apprehended. 1 8 Moreover, even if a defendant does try to flee, he or she would probably have to leave the
country to escape the nationwide powers of federal police agencies
99
1
to arrest and extradite.

Occasionally, however, federal authorities may need to obtain
the immediate arrest of the defendant prior to the filing of formal
charges. In such cases, a complaint is filed with a U.S. magistrate,
either before or immediately after arrest,2 00 and if the subsequent

preliminary hearing results in a finding of probable cause, the defendant is "held to district court."201 But not all such defendants
See text at note 23 supra.
At the time of our study, the prosecution of felonies and serious misdemeanors required the filing of an indictment or information in U.S. district court. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
7; 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976). An arrest warrant may be based on an indictment or information
or on a complaint filed with a U.S. magistrate. FED. R. CRiM. P. 4 & 9. During the two-andone-half-year period ending December 31, 1978, only 37% of defendants prosecuted in all 94
106
10

U.S. district courts were arrested prior to formal charging, and the percentage in the Northern District was 40%. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, FOURTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATJ3N OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL AcT OF 1974, supra note 24, Appendices A &
C. In our sample, which covers a slightly earlier period, 45% of prosecuted defendants were
arrested prior to formal charging (42%, excluding transfers into the district).
1" Under the liberal terms of the federal bail statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976), most
defendants are released pending trial. Fifty-six percent of the prosecuted defendants in our
sample were released on their own recognizance, and 94% obtained release on recognizance
or money bail. Thus arrest itself would rarely serve to assure either appearance at trial or
cessation of criminal activities.
190

Defendants arrested outside of the federal district in which they are charged are

ordered "removed" to the charging district upon a finding of probable cause, FED. R. CRiM.
P. 40, and are transported by U.S. marshals at no direct expense to the charging authorities.
200 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 & 5.
201

See id. 5.1(a). This "preliminary examination" is an adversary proceeding, but it is
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are eventually prosecuted, and the existence of these seemingly
"unnecessary" arrests suggests inefficiency as well as unfairness to
those arrested. The purpose of the following discussion is to try to
determine why the magistrate declinations in our sample required
arrest but not prosecution, and whether the number of such declinations could be reduced by more active participation by the prosecutor in the arrest decision.
At the time of our study, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District had a policy that magistrate's complaints and arrest warrants could not be issued without the approval of an Assistant U.S.
Attorney. 02 This procedure does not give the prosecutor control
over all arrests, since many are made by officers acting without a
warrant, 0 3 but in these latter cases, the prosecutor can refuse to
approve the filing of a complaint after arrest if prosecution does
not appear warranted. Such a system makes it possible, in theory
at least, to avoid filing any complaints in unprosecutable matters.
Moreover, complaints that are filed should then need to be declined only if unforeseeable evidentiary problems or alternatives to
prosecution later develop.
As Table 17 illustrates, magistrate declinations have not been
completely eliminated in the Northern District, but the incidence
of such declinations is low-7 % of all declined matters. In addition, the variation in the frequency of magistrate filings by offense
suggests that such filings are generally based on valid law enforcement needs for an early arrest. For example, many violent and
simple assault offenses require an "on the spot" arrest to terminate
or prevent continuing criminal behavior; cocaine and heroin offenses often require arrest immediately after the sale to an agent
or informant in order to prevent the flight of the accused or to
recover the "advance funds" used to make the purchase. 04 Yet not
frequently waived; waiver occurred for over half of the defendants in our sample who were
arrested prior to formal charging.
202 This procedure was strongly recommended by the most recent national crime commission. See U.S. NATIONAL ADvISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
supra note 2, Standard 1.2.
203 Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes such arrests, and the
Supreme Court recently held that the fourth amendment does not require police to obtain
an arrest warrant in advance, even if they have plenty of time to do so. United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Cf. Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382 (1980) (warrantless entry of defendant's home, to effect arrest, requires "exigent circumstances").
20 The immediate arrest of drug offenders might also be used to justify a search "incident" to arrest for further contraband or evidence of drug trafficking, under the rationale of
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). To a lesser extent, this may explain the
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all magistrate filings subsequently declined are so easily explained.
For instance, forgery and counterfeiting arrests are frequently
made by local police, but federal complaints are often issued as
well. Mail theft arrests are equally hard to explain, given the nonviolent nature of these suspects.
At the other extreme, certain white-collar offenses, such as
fraud, embezzlement, and "extortion," rarely involve a magistrate
filing.' 5 This is probably because such offenders, if prosecuted, do
not need to be apprehended until after the filing of formal charges;
they are unlikely to flee and do not need to be restrained from
continuing their criminal activities. 0 8
A comparison of the prosecuted cases in our sample shows
that these patterns are not unique to declined matters: although
51% of all prosecuted cases had a magistrate filing, only 11% of
the fraud and embezzlement cases had such a filing, and none of
the extortion cases did. In contrast, 86% of prosecuted drug cases
involved a magistrate filing, and the figures for mail theft and
counterfeiting were 89% and 100% respectively. Thus, it appears
that the decision to file a magistrate complaint is an offense-based
decision reflecting the underlying need for prompt arrest of certain
types of suspects prior to formal charging. Yet the prosecution of
some of these defendants is later declined, and the question remains whether they should have been arrested in the first place. In
particular, were they considered prosecutable at the time of arrest?
Table 18, showing average dollar amounts for the three groups
of declinations, casts some doubt on the extent to which all arrest
decisions are controlled, or at least guided, by prosecution policies.
Counterfeiting and other forgery cases declined after a magistrate
filing actually involve lower dollar amounts than the immediate
declinations, suggesting that the former, too, should be deemed de
minimis. The reasons for declination given in magistrate declinations, illustrated in Table 20, further suggest that many of these
decisions should have been foreseeable at the time of arrest: 29%
of these reasons involve the triviality of the offense, and 22% are
based on characteristics of the defendant. Overall, 56% of magistrate declinations are based in whole or in part on "policy" realarge number of pre-indictment arrests in forgery, counterfeiting, and mail-theft cases.
205 Most of the extortion cases in our sample were nonviolent, involving the abuse ot
official powers rather than physical threats. See Ruff, supra note 13, at 1175-76 (discussing
the broad interpretation given to the language of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)).
20" Such offenders are rarely "caught in the act," and are almost always released immediately on bail or recognizance. See note 198 supra.
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sons, most of which are determinable at the time of arrest.
To investigate further the possibility that the arrests that were
followed by magistrate declinations were not justified by either
prosecution merit or other factors, each of the declinations was examined individually. We considered an arrest to be sufficiently explained if (1) the amount of loss or contraband involved made the
case potentially prosecutable; 207 (2) the amount was unknown, but
at least one codefendant in the matter was eventually prosecuted; 0 8 or (3) the arrest was necessary to terminate violent behavior. 09 It was not always possible to apply these criteria, since the
details of the offense and the circumstances of arrest were sometimes not recorded in either the files of the court or those of the
U.S. Attorney. Even where such details were recorded, the above
criteria provide an imperfect measure of the extent of "unnecessary" federal arrests. A definitive study would have to be based on
the records of the law enforcement agencies involved, and should
probably be conducted concurrently with the events in question.
The results of this preliminary study, however, may determine
whether there is a need for further research or other efforts to improve the efficiency and fairness of arrest decisions.
As shown in Table 23, almost three-fourths of the magistrate
declinations met the above conditions for an explained arrest. The
"violent" cases included a threat on the life of the President by an
individual who turned out to be harmless, a major fight in a Veterans' Hospital (which was settled later by informal mediation), and
a spree of window smashing at a federal building by a person who
was subsequently found incompetent to stand trial. The arrests
207

Specifically, crimes were considered sufficiently "prosecutable" if the amounts of

loss or contraband involved fell within the range usually found in prosecuted cases for that
particular offense, or if the amount of loss or contraband was greater than the median
amount involved in all declined cases of that offense. This approach reflects our theory that
magistrate declinations should involve the most serious declined cases; it is, however, reasonable to expect such offenses to be at, or slightly below, the threshold for prosecution, as
measured by cases actually filed. Thus, it was necessary to set a threshold of "justification"
somewhat lower than the least serious prosecuted case.
208 If a matter is considered prosecutable, it seems appropriate to arrest all known suspects since the relative degrees of responsibility cannot always be determined at the outset,
and the less culpable defendants may agree to testify against the others.
209 It might be argued that arrest is justified whenever it will terminate any illegal behavior (for example, selling drugs), or when the defendant is likely to flee the jurisdiction. In
the former case, however, confiscation of the contraband, rather than arrest, is the most
effective means of dealing with continuing criminal acts. As for risk of flight, this problem is
irrelevant in a clearly nonprosecutable case. Moreover, almost all magistrate declinations
receive recognizance bonds, which suggests that failure to appear is not a major concern. See
note 211 infra.

328

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:246

that involved potentially prosecutable amounts of loss or contraband were later declined for a variety of reasons, including actual
state prosecution or conviction, deferred prosecution, a plea agreement, and other unforeseeable convictability problems, such as the
death of the suspect.
TABLE 23
APPARENT EXPLANATION FOp ARREST OF DECLINED DEFENDANTS

Percentage of Defendants*
Explained Arrests
Necessary to terminate violent behavior
Prosecutable amount of loss or contraband
Unknown amount; codefendant prosecuted
Subtotal

15
55
4
74

Unexplained Arrests
Drug offenses; unprosecutable amount
Forgery; unprosecutable amount
Counterfeiting; unprosecutable amount
Other unprosecutable offenses
Subtotal
Total

7
6
9
4
26
100

*Sample size: 53 defendants
NOTE: For a discussion of the criteria used to assess arrest justification, see
text at notes 207-209 supra.

The unexplained magistrate declinations most often involved
drug, forgery, and counterfeiting offenses-for example, 0.1 ounce
of cocaine or a twenty-dollar counterfeiting case. The need for immediate arrest in these types of cases has already been discussed, 10 but the question remains why federal authorities were
interested in these minor offenders in the first place. Given the
continuous "feedback" from the U.S. Attorney's office to the investigating agencies concerning the outcome of previously referred
matters, it seems unlikely that the agencies are ignorant of current
prosecution criteria. A more likely hypothesis is that these "small
2 0 See text at note 204 supra.
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fish" were thought, at the time of arrest, to be involved in criminal
activities of a larger scale, or were at least expected to provide information leading to the apprehension of major sellers and distributors of drugs, counterfeit money, or forged securities. 2 11 Such an
approach may represent the only effective means of investigating
such crimes, which often lack any direct, complaining witness, but
it obviously imposes certain costs on the court system and the defendants involved. More detailed studies of these arrests should focus on the law enforcement needs they serve, and the availability
of alternate strategies.
Future research should also consider the role of the U.S. Attorney, to discover if more active advance screening or better communication of current prosecution policy might further reduce the
number of arrests or magistrate filings not leading to prosecution.
The extent to which the U.S. Attorney currently controls arrest
and magistrate filings is unclear. At least 50% of all pre-indictment arrests appear to have been made prior to the filing of a complaint (that is, without a warrant)," 2 and although informal telephone conversations sometimes precede arrest, it seems unlikely
that the U.S. Attorney is able to do more than decide that such
matters are immediate declinations. Moreover, defendants charged
with drug offenses, mail theft, counterfeiting, and forgery frequently are caught in the act, which leads to immediate arrest and
referral for prosecution, with little opportunity for advance approval. Still, the U.S. Attorney could refuse to approve the filing of
a complaint in these matters, thus releasing the defendant and
conserving resources.2 1 3 Yet this was never done in the cases in our
sample.
The routine approval of complaints in apparently unprosecutable matters may be done to protect the officers from
charges of false arrest or to preserve the admissibility of any evidence seized, "just in case." Indeed, such routine filing may be desirable from a broader policy perspective. If the prosecutor refuses
to file a complaint, the officers will never receive a judicial critique
"' Another reason for arresting relatively minor offenders might be to achieve informal
retributive or deterrent effects by giving these defendants a "taste of jail." This explanation,
however, seems less likely, given the very low pretrial detention rates for most arrests in our
sample: 87% of the defendants in magistrate declinations were released on their own recognizance, and only 3% were detained at any time prior to declination.
M Fifty-one percent were arrested at least one day before issuance of the warrant, but
many more were arrested on the same day, and the exact order of events was not indicated
in the records.
213 See text and note at note 202 supra.
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of their arrest decision, and any later false-arrest claim or motion
to suppress will lack the prompt, written record that the warrant
procedure provides. Once the complaint is filed, however, prosecutors should move expeditiously to dismiss the case, if it lacks
21 4
prosecutable merit.

214 In our sample of magistrate declinations, the average length of time between the
filing of the complaint and the entry of the declination was 261 days, and only a small
portion of this delay appeared to reflect paperwork delays or prosecution of codefendants.

